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ABSTRACT 
The rise of radical Islamic converts in the Philippines is one of the major 
security concerns in the Philippines today. The Rajah Solaiman Islamic 
Movement (RSIM) emerged from various “Balik-Islam” (revert to Islam) 
organizations that advocate for the conversion of the country to Islam on the 
belief that the Philippines was an Islamic land prior to western colonization. 
RSIM, which established links with the various terrorist organizations both in the 
Philippines and in the Middle East, has been responsible for several major 
terrorist attacks in the country in recent years. 
Despite the arrests of several key leaders of RSIM and Philippine counter-
terrorism successes against the movement’s objectives, RSIM remains a major 
security concern in the Philippines due to the continued existence of social, 
political and economic factors that enable the possibility of RSIM or RSIM-like 
groups to re-emerge. The Philippine government must address the root causes 
of the problem in order to reduce the grievances of the people, weaken radical 
organizational strength, and control the political opportunities that have led to the 
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Just after midnight on February 27, 2004, 3.6 kg of TNT hidden inside a 
television and put in a box for shipping exploded onboard the MV Super Ferry 14. 
This Philippine registered passenger ship regularly carried hundreds of 
passengers from Manila to Davao City in the Southern Philippines. The explosion 
set the passenger ship afire, causing 416 casualties (116 dead, 300 injured) out 
of its 744 commercial passengers and 155 crewmembers aboard (Chalk, 2006, 
p. 1). 
The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) immediately claimed the incident, which is 
considered one of the worst maritime terrorist attacks in Philippine history. ASG 
is an Al Qaeda linked Philippine terrorist organization responsible for several high 
profile terror activities in recent years (ICG Report, 2005, pp. 16-18). Philippine 
authorities later learned that the ferry incident was a joint operation conducted by 
elements of the ASG and a lesser-known group of Islamic converts known as the 
Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM) (Banlaoi, 2007, p. 9). 
Records of the voyage indicate that at 8:00 pm on February 26, 2004, a 
passenger identified as Arnulfo Alvarado checked in at number 51-B, the A deck 
of the passenger ship’s middle section. Alvarado, who easily blended in with the 
rest of the passengers, brought with him a large cardboard box as his main 
luggage. The box contained a hollowed-out television set packed with the 
improvised explosive device (IED) responsible for the devastation. At 9:00 pm, 
Alvarado was able to disembark from the ship by claiming he needed to buy 
some food for the trip. Alvarado never returned, and at 11:00 pm the passenger 
ship left Manila for its journey to the Southern Philippines. The ship completed 90 
minutes of its voyage, sailing along Manila Bay between Corrigidor and El Fraile 
islands, before the bomb detonated. The explosion damaged the ship and  
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immediately set it afire, partially sinking it off the coast of Manila Bay. After 
several days of rescue and recovery operations, 63 bodies were recovered and 
53 remained unaccounted for (Chalk, 2006, p. 1). 
Philippine authorities pursued leads, and four weeks into their 
investigation they arrested Arnulfo Alvarado. Alvarado’s confession revealed that 
his real name is Redendo Cain Dellosa. An Islamic convert, Alvarado was one of 
the original members of the Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM), and had 
been previously arrested in May 2002 at an RSIM training camp in the Northern 
Philippines. Alvarado claimed that the ferry bombing mission was a joint 
operation conducted by the ASG and the RSIM based on the guidance from 
Khadafi Janjalani, the ASG leader (Banlaoi, 2007, p. 9). 
The MV Super Ferry 14 bombing demonstrated an operational link 
between the Al Qaeda supported ASG and the group of radical Islamic converts 
who are advocating for the conversion to Islam of the whole Philippines. The 
RSIM emerged from the “Balik-Islam” (revert to Islam) Movement (BIM) which 
began in the 1970s and now reportedly has over 200,000 Christian converts to 
the Islamic faith. Members prefer to be called “reverts” instead of “converts” due 
to their belief that the Philippines was originally a Muslim country prior to Western 
colonization in the 15th century (Banlaoi, 2006, p. 1).1 
Islamic converts have been conducting terrorist operations in an 
increasing trend that has garnered the notice of governments since the attacks 
on September 11, 2001 (Monlatke, 2005, p. 2). Converts often carry out acts of 
terrorism in areas to which foreign terrorists do not have access. Of the recent 
terrorist attacks conducted outside of Iraq, most involved Muslim converts. For 
instance, Germaine Lindsay, a Jamaican-born convert, was one of the four 
suicide bombers in the July 7, 2005 London bombing (Monlatke, 2005, p. 2). 
Other incidents include Richard Reid, the “shoe bomber,” a mixed-race British 
                                            
1 The choice of the term “revert” is a political one in the sense that it empowers a historical 
viewpoint that is not shared by the vast majority of Filipinos. For the remainder of this thesis, the 
term “convert” will be used, except when the term “revert” was chosen by the quoted reference.  
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citizen who converted to Islam while in prison and tried to detonate explosives 
hidden in the soles of his shoes; Jose Padilla, an American convert who is still in 
detention for planning a dirty bomb attack in Chicago (Coleman, 2002, p. 2); and 
John Walker Lindh, another American convert, who after converting to Islam 
traveled to Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban against Coalition Forces (Bassi, 
2006, p. 1). 
The Philippines is not a new setting for this general phenomenon. Several 
Filipino Muslim converts have been involved in major terrorist incidents in recent 
years. They have emerged from the thousands of Islamic converts who now 
embrace Islam for various reasons. Since the 1970s, attacks by converts are 
reportedly more fanatical and dangerous than those experienced by the country 
at the hands of traditional Muslim terrorists (Special Report, pcij.org, 2003, p. 1). 
Converts are frequently more radical in their interpretation of Islam and have a 
wider sphere of influence, as they can blend easily with the dominant Christian 
Filipino populace. 
Since the 1990s, long-established Muslim radical groups have begun to 
exploit Islamic converts’ ability to conduct operations in both the traditional 
Muslim areas of the south and in other major Christian dominated cities in the 
northern and central regions in the Philippines. Major terrorist groups have 
expanded their abilities to conduct operations because of the converts’ ability to 
blend with the Christian environment, their knowledge of the culture in the 
Christian areas, and their wider mass base support in non-Muslim areas in the 
Philippines. Since the discovery of these capabilities in 2002, Philippine 
authorities have progressively more become concerned with extremist Islamic 
converts and their alliances with terror networks (Mendoza, 2002, p. 111).  
However, increased counter-terrorism efforts by Philippine authorities have led to 
arrests of top leaders of the RSIM, disrupted their networks, and strained their 
ties with other terrorist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf, the Jemaah Islamiah (JI), 
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).  
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Despite the arrests of its key leaders and the disruption of its networks, 
there are still several vital questions that should be addressed regarding 
terrorism conducted by Muslim converts in the Philippines. This thesis addresses 
five key research questions: 1) Do the remnants of RSIM pose a significant threat 
to the Philippine government?; 2) What is the likelihood that RSIM, or a group 
similar to it, will emerge in the future?; 3) Do the increasing number of Christians 
embracing the Islamic faith provide a pool of potential recruits for radical converts 
that can be used for future terrorist activities by different radical groups?; 4) What 
role does the overseas worker program play in the Balik Islam phenomena?; 5) If 
a significant threat exists, what policies should the Philippine government 
consider adopting to insure its security? 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE  
In order to answer these questions, this thesis will provide an analysis of 
Islamic converts in the Philippines by studying the motivational factors for 
conversion and the genesis and development of the “Balik-Islam” Movement 
(BIM). From this point, the paper will analyze how a portion of the organization 
became radicalized and resorted to the use of terrorism under the name of the 
Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM). The purpose of this research is to 
examine the emergence of BIM and its related radical group RSIM from a social 
movement perspective in order to determine whether this is truly a concern for 
the government of the Philippines and the international community. To this end, 
this study will consider various factors associated with the growth of the Islamic 
converts in the Philippines and the radicalization process of members that are 
co-opted by terrorist organizations. Additionally, it will provide strategic level 
policy recommendations to the Manila government as it seeks to address the 
threat of RSIM and the rise of the radical Islamic converts.  Lastly, this study will 
consider the operational and tactical concerns that the government must 
understand as it addresses this threat.    
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While there are several issues related to the ideas explored in this thesis 
(for instance, the Muslim secessionist movement in the Southern Philippines and 
ongoing peace initiatives), this thesis will limit its scope to the study of the “Balik-
Islam” Movements and the rise of Islamic converts in the Philippines. We address 
the conversion process, social factors in the BIM’s growth, and the BIM’s 
ideology. We will exclude exhaustive analysis of other terrorist threat groups 
linked to the RSIM, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Jemaah Islamiah 
(JI), and the communist New People’s Army (NPA). 
C. THESIS METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
By using contemporary social movement theory as the basic theoretical 
framework, this thesis provides a qualitative analysis of the rise of the “Balik- 
Islam” Movement (BIM) and its radical group, the RSIM. Using government 
reports, news articles, related studies made by security experts, interviews, and 
other related materials as data, the study will present an analysis of the different 
social factors contributing to the rise of Islamic converts in the Philippines and 
provide recommendations as to how the government can address the threat from 
radical Islamic converts.  
Chapter I provides the necessary background on the Rajah Solaiman 
Islamic Movement (RSIM) as one of the major terrorist groups in the Philippines. 
This opening chapter further details information on one of the most violent 
terrorist acts perpetrated by the group in recent years—the MV Super Ferry 14 
bombing. Chapter I also discusses the scope and purpose of the research, its 
limitations, and the thesis organization. 
Chapter II discusses the related literature: the Political Process model 
developed by Doug McAdam and the historical background relevant to the 
increasing conflict between Islamic radicalism and Christian Muslims in the 
Philippines. Chapter III begins by discussing the Balik-Islam Movement and its 
growth, and then focuses on the splinter group of the Rajah Solaiman Islamic 
 6
Movement (RSIM), including its history, organization, background, leadership, 
linkages, funding, and ideology. This chapter further highlights the process of 
conversion through an examination of the RSIM founder and leader Ahmed 
Santos, as well as the group’s links with different threat organizations in the 
Philippines and the Middle East. In order to provide a clearer view of the RSIM’s 
recruitment, this thesis discusses the critical role played by the Overseas Filipino 
Workers (OFW) program in the Middle East.  
Chapter IV reviews the factors still present within RSIM to determine 
whether it remains a threat or a potential threat in the Philippine security 
environment. Using the Political Process model, the chapter discusses how 
various expanding political opportunities, organizational strength, and insurgents’ 
consciousness have led to the growth of the Islamic converts.  
Chapter V summarizes our conclusions and provides policy 
recommendations addressing the potential threats that emerge from radical 
groups embedded among Islamic converts in the Philippines. The thesis attempts 
to offer realistic and attainable policy recommendations based on the existing 
national policy and strategic programs of the Philippine government in its overall 
national security strategy. 
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II. THEORETICAL APPROACH FOR ANALYSIS 
For our analysis, we draw on the Political Process model, which has its 
roots in the work of Charles Tilly, but was ultimately developed by Doug Mcdam 
in his 1982 work “Political Process and Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-
1970” (McAdam, 1982). Christian Smith’s summary of McAdam’s work and 
methodology will also guide our discussion of the Political Process model, as it 
will be used in our analysis (Smith, 1991, pp. 51-67).  
A. POLITICAL PROCESS MODEL 
The Political Process model specifies three key variables in the 
emergence and life-course of social movements: (1) the relative availability of 
political opportunities in the broad political environment; (2) the relative strength 
of related organizations that can help facilitate a social movement; and (3) the 
collective realization that social change is both imperative and viable (McAdam, 
1982, p. 58). 
1. Expanding Political Opportunities 
Minority populations, for the most part, face numerous challenges to 
affecting change within a society. Moreover, opportunities for movements to 
overcome such challenges are rare and fluctuate over time. According to the 
Political Process model, only when these so-called opportunities expand to a 
significant degree can budding social movements have any hope of mobilizing 
successfully. Factors leading to the expansion of opportunities relate to 





Any event or broad social process that serves to undermine the 
calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment 
is structured occasions a shift in political opportunities. Among the 
events and processes likely to prove disruptive of the political 
status quo are wars, industrialization, international political 
realignments, prolonged unemployment, and widespread 
demographic changes. (p. 41) 
These political opportunities can manifest themselves in three broad forms: (1) 
political instability, (2) enhanced political positions of the aggrieved populations, 
or (3) ideological openness (McAdam, 1982, p. 42). 
Political instability occurs when the control of the existing power structure 
weakens. In order to maintain the status quo, dominant groups must expend their 
political capital and resources to counter movements which are attempting to 
exploit the instability  (McAdam, 1982, p. 42). Short duration events, such as 
economic crisis, armed conflict, and traumatic world events (war, pestilence, 
drought, tsunami, earthquake, etc), can rattle the existing political structure and 
raise the possibility of policy reforms that benefit aggrieved populations as they 
seek to maintain stability for the dominant group  (Smith, 1991, p. 59). 
An increase in the political position (i.e., power) of aggrieved populations 
can result from broad social changes that occur over extended periods of time. 
Successful insurgencies typically do not emerge merely because of widespread 
political instability, but also because of broad social processes that have 
strengthened the aggrieved population’s political power (Jenkins & Perrow, 1977, 
p. 266). “Consequently, the increase in political opportunity through enhanced 
political positions for movement groups is usually achieved more gradually than 
through political instability” (Smith, 1991, p. 59).  
Smith extends McAdam’s model to include ideological openness as a third 
factor by which political opportunities can expand. Broad social changes may 
lead the social environment to tolerate alternative, critical, and even subversive 
ideas and worldviews espoused by the aggrieved population and other 
associated movements (McAdam, 1982, p. 43). “Since the exercise of power is 
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often closely linked to the manipulation of ideas, the expansion of freedom of 
thought and expression combined with an influx of creative, critical ideas may 
result in a marked increase in political opportunity for potential movement 
groups” (Smith, 1991, p. 59). 
All three of these factors can expand the political opportunities available to 
aggrieved populations and provide a means for them to increase their relative 
power within a society. Nevertheless, in themselves, these favorable 
environmental changes only increase the probability that budding insurgent 
movements will be able to mobilize successfully. Whether they actually do so or 
not depends on two other factors: an increase in indigenous organizational 
strength and the development of an insurgent consciousness (Smith, 1991, p. 
59). 
2. Organizational Strength  
As noted above, expanding political opportunities are not enough to 
engender the birth of a social movement. To successfully mobilize, activists also 
need access to the resources necessary to mobilize and sustain their cause. As 
McAdam explains: “A conducive political environment only affords the aggrieved 
population the opportunity for successful insurgent action. It is the resources of 
the minority community that enable insurgent groups to exploit these 
opportunities” (McAdam, 1982, p. 43).  Resources include things such as the 
increased education and wealth within the aggrieved population or access to the 
wealth of sympathetic (and often international) supporters.  Nevertheless, 
McAdam argues that the most important resource available to insurgent groups 
are strong, indigenous organizations because they are able contribute five key 
resources to a social movement: members, leaders, solidary incentives, 
communication networks and enterprise tools.  We discuss each of these in turn. 
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a. Members   
Individuals do not automatically band themselves into social 
movements. Rather, isolated individuals often move towards familiar 
organizations and settings that allow them to interact with other individuals who 
share similar grievances (Sageman, 2004, p. 63). McAdam (1982) argues that 
“the more interaction individuals have within an aggrieved community, the easier 
it is for them to be recruited and mobilized” (McAdam, 1982, p. 44). “No matter 
how a typical participant describes his reasons for joining the movement, or what 
motives may be suggested by a social scientist on the basis of deprivation, 
disorganization, or deviancy models, it is clear that the original decision to join 
required some contact with the movement”” (Gerlach & Hine, 1970, p. 79).). 
Movements generally recruit individuals in one of two ways: (1) through existing 
ties that the individuals have with organizations that are linked to the movement, 
or through what Oberschall, (1973) describes as “bloc recruitment”, in which the 
movement arises out of the merger of various groups already existing within the 
aggrieved population (p. 125). 
b. Leaders  
Leadership proves another vital factor in a movement’s ability to 
succeed and operate. Insurgency leaders provide the guidance and 
organizational direction needed to focus the movement’s energies towards its 
objective (McAdam, 1982, p. 47). As Smith (1991) notes, “Since leadership skills 
are typically cultivated over time through experience, existing organizations often 
serve the function of a training ground for social movement leaders” (p. 60). 
Once an individual has established credibility within the aggrieved population, the 
leader is often one of the first members to join an emerging organization due to 
their status within the community (McAdam, 1982, p. 47).  Such leaders often 
serve as examples for like-minded individuals within the aggrieved population, 
which in turn results in the movement’s increased ability to recruit, fundraise, and 
network. 
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c. Established Incentives 
Since movements have roots in existing organizations, they are 
often able to utilize the “established structures of solidary incentives” that existing 
organizations have created in order to function effectively. McAdam (1982) 
describes “solidary incentives” as: 
a myriad of interpersonal rewards that provide the motive force for 
participation in these groups. It is the salience of these rewards that 
helps explain why recruitment through established organizations is 
generally so efficient. (p. 45) 
The ability of movements to draw on existing solidary incentives 
helps them to overcome the “free rider problem,” the phenomenon that 
movements often face when attempting to recruit individuals for action that may 
require sacrifice on their part when they would be able to reap the rewards of any 
successes achieved by the movements whether they participated or not (Smith, 
1991, p. 60). Drawing on the solidary incentives of existing organizations simply 
allows potential members to transfer their membership and efforts from an 
organization to which they are already committed to a movement with more 
focused objectives. McAdam (1982) writes: 
These organizations already rest on a solid structure of solidary 
incentives that insurgents have, in effect, appropriated by defining 
movement participation as synonymous with organizational 
membership. Accordingly, the myriad of incentives that have 
heretofore served as the motive force for participation in the group 
are now simply transferred to the movement. Thus, insurgents have 
been spared the difficult task of inducing participation through the 
provision of new incentives of either a solidary or material nature. 
(p. 47) 
d. Communication Networks  
Since “a social movement is a new cultural item subject to the 
same pattern of diffusion and adoption as other innovations” (McAdam, 1982, p. 
47), the ability for movements to effectively communicate among members is 
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crucial for their ability to mobilize. When movements utilize existing organizations 
as their foundation for recruitment, the existing formal and informal 
communication infrastructure is co-opted as members realign their allegiances 
(McAdam, 1982, pp. 46-47 and Freeman, 1973). “The inter-organizational 
linkages characteristic of established groups facilitate movement emergence by 
providing the means of communication by which the movement, as a new cultural 
item, can be disseminated throughout the aggrieved population” (McAdam, 1982, 
p. 47). 
e. Enterprise Tools 
Emerging movements inevitably face constraints such as shortages 
in materials, funds, and infrastructure that hinder their ability to operate 
effectively. In order to overcome these constraints, movements often exploit 
preexisting systems made available through the government or rely on their 
connections with other organizations, communities, or sympathizers. 
Furthermore, globalization has empowered movements that formerly would have 
suffered under such obstacles by enabling them access to a wide variety of 
communication tools (cell phones, email, websites, and media exposure). 
While expanding political opportunities and increases in indigenous 
organizational strength are necessary factors in the emergence of social 
movements, together they are insufficient for a movement to get off the ground 
(McAdam, 1982, p. 48). The development of a third factor, namely an insurgent 
consciousness, is also necessary.   
3. Insurgent Consciousness 
People who feel contentment with the current political and social climate 
are unlikely to form or participate in a movement to bring about social change. 
Rather, a social movement draws people who are unhappy with the status quo. 
Nevertheless, discontent by itself does not produce social movements; there 
needs to be a transformation of consciousness. People must recognize that they 
share these grievances with others and believe that they can do something about 
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them. Put simply, people must experience some sort of cognitive realization that 
change is not only necessary, but also possible. Christian Smith (1991) calls this 
transformation the development of an insurgent consciousness, which is a 
“collective state of understanding” (p. 61) that perceives, interprets, and explains 
a social situation in such a way that it compels people to organize and act in 
order to change the social situation. 
Before using social movement theory as the broad frame of reference to 
present our analysis in chapter four, we now turn to a brief historical presentation 
of the “Balik Islam” Movement (BIM) in the Philippines.  
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III. EMERGENCE OF A RADICAL “BALIK-ISLAM” MOVEMENT: 
THE CASE OF RAJAH SOLAIMAN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT (RSIM) 
After the September 11, 2001 incident, a renewed global focus on 
international terrorism exposed an emerging trend. A new group of individuals 
who have converted to Islam are actively contributing to terrorist acts throughout 
the world. These people, who were raised in the Christian (or another) faith in 
their own country, have found themselves embracing Islam, and are now willing 
to sacrifice their lives for their new cause. “Converts to Islam have been involved 
in virtually every major Al Qaeda-inspired cell uncovered in Europe since the 
September 2001 attacks in the US” (Contenta, 2006, p. 1). 
The Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM) has emerged from the 
ranks of different organizations within the “Balik-Islam” Movement (BIM) as part 
of this new trend. Although the BIM greatly influenced the creation of RSIM, the 
latter group represents only a very small portion of BIM members. Considered 
more radical in their views, RSIM has ties with the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the regional terrorist group Jemaah 
Islamiah (JI), and receives funding from international terrorist groups. For this 
reason, some Philippine security experts consider RSIM to be one of the most 
serious threats developing in the Philippines (NICA Report, 2007, p. 2). 
A. THE “BALIK-ISLAM” MOVEMENT (BIM) 
The “Balik-Islam” (revert to Islam) Movement (BIM) is one of the fastest 
growing social movements in the Philippines today (Banlaoi, 2007, p. 2). Muslim 
fundamentalism and extremism in the Philippines had been growing steadily in 
the past few years, mainly due to the international trend in Islamic revivalism in 
the Middle East and in other Muslim countries (Mendoza, 2005). BIM is a loose 
conglomeration of Filipino Christian converts to the Islamic faith who believe that 
the Philippines was a Muslim country prior to western colonization and that all 
Filipinos need to revert back to their original faith (Undog, 2005, p. 3). 
 16
“Balik Islam” thus refers to various groups of converts who advocate the 
return of the Philippines to the Islam. “There is no pattern on the state of mind, 
educational background, and social status of people converted to Islam. 
However, some of the factors that attracted them include employment, quest for 
purity and abhorrence to materialism, and perceived immorality of secular 
society” (Agustin, 2005, p. 6). Dr. Luis Lacar, a professor at the Mindanao State 
University (MSU) in the Southern Philippines, describes BIM as “a movement of 
individuals who made a paradigm shift in their ordered view of life from one 
perspective to another” (Banlaoi, 2007, p. 2). In his study “Balik-Islam: Christian 
Converts to Islam in the Philippines, Lacar (2003) notes that “it was the strong 
feeling of insecurity that made them decide to convert” (Special Report, pcij.org, 
p. 1). He also notes, “The converts, finding security in their newfound religion, 
became zealous defenders of Islam” (p. 1). 
1. Historical Background  
The Philippines is a predominantly Christian country with a small Muslim 
population. Approximately 83 percent of the population is Catholic, while about 
five percent is Muslim, most living on the southern island of Mindanao (Country 
Profile, 2006, p. 9). Christianity was introduced to the Philippines by Spanish 
colonizers in the 15th century. With the exception of the Moro people in the 
southern region, who continued to pursue their own beliefs, identity and culture, a 
majority of the population adopted Christianity as the religion of choice. 
Prior to the arrival of the Spanish colonizers, Muslim traders arrived in 
Sulu Archipelago as early as the 13th century and established the Sultanate of 
Sulu in 1450; the Islam faith was accordingly spread throughout pockets within 
the Southern Philippines (Banlaoi, 2006, p. 2). By the end of the 13th century, 
Muslim traders and missionaries established settlements in the southern region 




p. 1). Professor Rommel Banlaoi (2006) argues that, “were not for the Spanish 
colonial rule… the Philippines would have been a Muslim country, much like its 
Southeast Asian neighbors” (p. 2).  
As a result of educational experiences within a broader international 
community, young Filipino Muslims have increased gained awareness of the 
trends and developments in the Muslim faith. During the 1970s, Arab petro-
dollars provided scholarship grants to young Filipino Muslims at numerous 
universities in the Middle East similar to the Al-Azhar University in Egypt. Upon 
their return to the Philippines, these new missionaries became dedicated to 
establishing Islamic schools and propagating Islam throughout the different 
regions of the country (Undog, 2005, p. 1).  
Conversion to Islam has occurred within the Philippines for centuries. 
During the Spanish era, Filipino Christians converted to the Islamic faith because 
of inter-marriage, or for personal or economic reasons. An early noteworthy 
example occurred in 1842. Pedro Cuevas escaped from authorities in Cavite, 
Southern Luzon, and settled on the island of Basilan in the Southern Philippines.  
While there, Cuevas fought and killed a local chieftain in the area; in order to be 
accepted by the local tribe, he converted to Islam and adopted the name Datu 
Kalun. He later married a local woman and led the natives against invaders and 
pirates in Basilan and Jolo (Special Report, pcij.org, 2003, p. 1).  
Contemporary conversion to Islam peaked in the 1970s, during the height 
of the Moro uprising against the Philippine government. “Out of fear for their lives 
and their family’s security, Christian settlers in Mindanao were forced to convert 
to Islam” (Special Report, pcij.org, 2003, p. 1). Aside from this, inter-marriage 
between Christian settlers and Muslims has been another leading contributor to 
conversions. These marriages resulted in the mixed-ethnicity offspring 
(“mestizo”) who later became urban migrants entering universities, government 
or civil society sectors, and who now occupy key positions in society (ICG 
Report, 2005, p. 3). 
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One of the most significant factors contributing to the rise of radical Islamic 
converts in the Philippines is the “Tabligh” missionaries. The movement became 
very active in the Philippines during the 1980s when foreign Islamists from 
Pakistan, Libya and Egypt arrived in Mindanao and taught radical Islam (Special 
Report, pcij.org, 2003, p. 1). Aminkadra Undog (2005) notes, “The first 
documented activity of ‘Balik-Islam’ which has contributed to the prominence of 
the BIM is that of Hadji Akmad del Rio, an Ilocano who migrated to General 
Santos in Mindanao” (p. 3). After his conversion to Islam in 1981, Akmad del Rio 
organized a movement that solicited funds from Middle Eastern organizations 
such as the Saudi Arabian Islamic Missionary Council (Undog, 2005, p. 3).  
However, the biggest contributors in the number of Islamic converts in the 
Philippines are the Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW). Since the 1970’s, these 
workers have been exposed to the teachings of Islam while working in several 
Middle East countries. The OFW feels drawn to the Islam faith for a variety of 
reasons: a desire for job security or community, boredom, loneliness, or simple 
faith (Special Report, pcij.org, 2003, p. 1). The influx of Filipino OFWs began 
when Middle Eastern countries experienced an economic boost as a result of 
dramatically rising oil prices. In 1974, Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos 
enacted a new labor code that allowed a massive increase in the number of 
Filipino workers permitted to work in the Middle East. By the end of 2001, there 
were 915,239 Filipinos in Saudi Arabia and 1.5 million OFW throughout the 
Middle East (ICG Report, 2005, p. 4). In 2003, the Middle East continued to be 
the top destination for land-based Filipino Contract workers, accounting for 32% 
of the total number of OFW (Briefing, Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 2006).  
As their contracts ended in the Middle East, these OFW returned to the 
Philippines and formed numerous organizations that propagated the Islamic 
teachings to which they had been exposed. They received funding from 
organizations in the Middle East and established their own Islamic schools in 
traditionally Christian dominated areas. These organizations form the core of 
what is known today as the “Balik-Islam” (revert to Islam) Movement (BIM). 
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2. Profile of an Islamic “Revert”  
Aminkadra Undog (2005) remarks that a Filipino convert has “no 
discernible pattern on their state of mind, educational background and social 
status” (p. 4). These socially normal Filipino individuals are regular features of 
local public places, schools, markets, government offices, and other sectors of 
the Philippine society. They represent people from across the different strata of 
the Philippine social system. Chief Superintendent Rodolfo “Boogie” Mendoza2 of 
the Philippine National Police (PNP) traces the roots of Filipino conversion to 
poverty, social disappointments, and the perceived failures of the government to 
deliver basic services to the people (Undog, 2005, p. 4); in search of a better life, 
Filipinos have resorted to religion as an emotional and psychological outlet.  
Mendoza argues, “Filipinos are fond of searching for new horizons and are 
naturally very religious…. they turn to religion to escape the disappointments of 
this life” (Villaviray, 2003. p. 1). 
However, even the middle class and highly educated Filipinos may 
convert to Islam. Abdullah Yusuf Abu Bakr Ledesma, the spokesman of the 
Balik-Islam Unity Congress (BIUC) who holds a PhD from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) in the United States, stated, “I became a Muslim 
because Roman Catholicism has been hijacked by the west…I believe that unlike 
in other religions, there is no mystery in Islam, only pure logic” (Special Report, 
pcij.org, 2003, p. 1). Known as Joey Ledesma before his conversion to Islam, he 
is a member of an elite family in Manila and teaches economics at De La Salle 
University, one of the leading universities in the Philippines. His uncle is an 
ambassador and has a wide connection in Manila’s wealthy society. 
Nevertheless, he still chose to convert to Islam (Villaviray, 2003, p. 3).  
 
                                            
2 Within the Philippine law enforcement community, General Mendoza is the leading authority 
on the RSIM. He was credited with uncovering the group’s existence, and he provided leadership 
and direction during the 2002 investigation and arrest of RSIM members.  
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Today, there is no precise headcount of BIM membership numbers.  
Based on the article published in the ISN Security Watch entitled Suicide 
Terrorism in the Philippines, the “’Balik-Islam Movement’ is a legitimate 
organization of at least 200,000 Christian converts to the Islamic faith” (Banlaoi, 
2008, p. 1). On the other hand, the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA) reports that 
more than 110,000 Filipinos have converted to Islam as of the first quarter of 
2005. Among the most prominent “Balik-Islam” front organizations are the Fi 
Sabilillah Dawah and Media Foundation, the Islamic Studies for Call and 
Guidance (ISCAG), the Islamic Information Center (IIC) and the Islamic Wisdom 
Worldwide (IWW) (Special Report, pcij.org, 2003, p. 2).  Banlaoi (2007) notes 
that “the Islamic Information Center (IIC) claims to have been reverting three to 
five Filipinos everyday” (p. 2). He further notes that most of the conversions are 
conducted in Islamic schools (madrassa) and other organizations such as the Fi 
Sabillilah Dawah and Media Center, which claims that they are reverting two to 
three persons daily (Banlaoi, 2007, p. 2). 
B. THE RAJAH SOLAIMAN ISLAMIC MOVEMENT (RSIM) 
1. The Origin and Development of the RSIM   
The Rajah Solaiman Islamic Movement (RSIM) is a radical Islamic group 
that was first uncovered in 2002 after police executed a series of operations in 
the province of Pangasinan, located on the main island of Luzon. The RSIM 
evolved from the creation of the Jihad Fi Sabilillah (JFS) in 1995, which calls for 
the propagation of jihad and the conversion of the entire Philippines to Islam. The 
JFS later adopted the name Fi-Sabilillah Da’wah and Media Foundation 
Incorporated (FSDMFI) (Special Report, AFP, 2006, p. 1).  
The FSDMFI preaches Islamic purification to the “Balik-Islam” community 
through a radio program aired over the DWBL radio station every Saturday. The 
organization has also used film clips showing Muslim oppressions in different  
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parts of the world to agitate its audience. Its primary objective is to propagate 
“the true essence of Islam and to correct the misconception about Islam and 
Muslims” (Banlaoi, 2007, p. 4).  
Prior to the discovery of the RSIM in 2002, concerns that Islamic coverts 
in the country were already active in terrorism were realized. As early as 1988, 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) founder Abdurajak Janjalani met a Muslim convert who 
became a Muslim scholar. Jovenal Bruno, who studied in Libya, joined the ASG, 
and was responsible in the establishment of Middle Eastern networks for the Abu 
Sayyaf. In 1995, Bruno and Khadafi Janjalani (the younger brother of the ASG 
founder) were captured by Philippine military, but escaped from detention a year 
later. While in detention, he wrote “Moro Fundamentalism”, a paper “which 
places emphasis on the appropriate response of the government on radical 
Islamic revivalism in Mindanao” (Mendoza, 2005, p. 4). The ASG eventually killed 
Bruno in 1998, suspecting him to be working as a government agent. Jovenal 
Bruno’s rank and contribution to the Abu Sayyaf Group was noteworthy for 
converts, as it was the first time a “’Balik-Islam’ individual held a vital position in a 
known terrorist group” (Mendoza, 2005, p. 9).  
Rommel Banlaoi (2007) believes that the idea of organizing the RSIM was 
“conceptualized in FSDMFI Office at Cubao, Quezon City during 2000 and 2001 
in order to have a legitimate organization”, and that the “core members of the 
FSDMFI were the individuals who formed the core membership of the RSIM” (p. 
4). Banlaoi further notes that “it was Chief Superintendent Rodolfo Mendoza 
PNP, who says that the name Rajah Solaiman Movement was initially suggested 
by Ahmed Santos as a joke but it was eventually adopted. The RSIM was also 
inspired by the Rajah Solaiman mosque in Binangonan, Rizal in Southern Luzon” 
(p. 5). 
The RSIM founders established the group in honor of Rajah Solaiman, a 
Filipino Muslim ruler of Manila before the Spanish conquest in the 15th century. 
Solaiman was reportedly a grandson of the Sultan of Brunei and a scion of the 
Bornean dynasty (ICG Report, 2005, p. 3). However, in his article Radical Muslim 
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Terrorism in the Philippines, Rommel Banlaoi (2006) points out (ironically), 
“Based on historical records, Rajah Solaiman was a Spanish collaborator during 
the Spanish period, unlike his other Muslim brothers in the Southern Philippines. 
Thus, organizing a Muslim liberation movement in his honor is an apparent 
contradiction” (p. 17).  Santos and Lavilla originally called the group, “Harakat,” 
which means “The Movement” (Banlaoi, 2007, p. 5). 
As early as December 2001, Philippine police were receiving reports on a 
new group of individuals conducting meetings in a remote village of Mal-Ong, in 
the town of Anda in the Pangasinan province in the Northern Philippines. Follow 
up police operations revealed a presence of a madrasah (an Islamic school), 
which operated as a training area for radical Islamic teachings as well as an 
evening meeting place for members (Mendoza, 2005, pp. 6-7). 
On May 1, 2002, a shooting incident occurred in the village of San Nicolas 
in Tarlac City between Philippine National Police (PNP) elements and two armed 
men who police later identified as Islamic converts. Police killed one of them, 
Khalid Trinidad, and captured the other, Dexter Payumo. Payumo confirmed the 
presence of a training camp for militant Islamic converts on privately owned land 
in Anda, Pangasinan (Banlaoi, 2007, p. 5).  Based on information provided by 
Payumo, Philippine authorities raided the compound on May 2002, arresting six 
people and recovering firearms, training and bomb making materials and 
documents directly linking the group to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 
(Mendoza, 2002, p. 113). This information allowed police to conduct follow-up 
operations that would later reveal the existence of the Rajah Solaiman Islamic 
Movement (RSIM) (Mendoza, 2002, p. 116).  
2. Ideological Foundation  
The rise of groups like the RSIM traces its genesis back to the height of 
the Muslim rebellion in Mindanao in the 1970s. The peak of the Bangsa Moro 
uprising led by Nur Misuari of the MNLF provided the political and the social 
conditions for the emergence of the “Balik-Islam” Movement (BIM), not only in 
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Mindanao but in Christian areas in the Philippines (Banlaoi, 2007, p. 3). Dr. Luis 
Lacar, a professor at the Mindanao State University (MSU), describes Balik-Islam 
as “movements of individuals who have made a paradigm shift …from one 
perspective to another” (Banlaoi, 2007, p. 2). The experience of Overseas 
Filipino Workers (OFW) in the Middle East during the 1970s, the rise of Islamic 
radicalism in the Middle East, and the exposure of Filipinos in several conflicts in 
Muslim countries inspired a group of radical converts to use violence in the 
advancement of their cause. Mendoza describes them as the “different 
generations of Muslim radicals” and the rise of the RSIM as the “third generation 
of Muslim radicals in the Philippines” (Mendoza, personal communication, April 3, 
2008). 
Radicals founded the RSIM in 2001 with the main objective of converting 
the whole of the Philippines to Islam. The goal of the movement is initially to 
establish an Islamic city in Luzon in which Muslims can enforce the strict 
implementation of the Islamic law or Shariah. The RSIM adheres to the same 
principles of the Darusallam Abubakar concept pursued by the MILF as 
envisioned by Salamat Hashim, the founder and former Chairman of the MILF 
(Special Report, AFP, 2006, p. 1). 
The ideological foundation of the RSIM is based on the “Balik-Islam” 
Movement claim that the whole Philippines was once a Muslim country before 
the Spanish colonization. Mendoza (2005) argues, “The mission of the present 
day fundamentalists and extremists is to revert Christian Filipinos into what they 
claim to be the original religion….” (p. 1). These BIM groups claim that historical 
evidence confirms this belief because even before the arrival of the Spaniards, 
the Sultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao was established between the mid- 
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries (ICG Report, 2005, p. 3).  
After the series of recent arrests of RSIM leaders, there is a reported split 
in the ideological direction of the RSIM. Santos, who belonged to the “Islamist 
faction,” aligned with the ASG and the JI, while Mike Abrera, a former NPA 
member, heads the “nationalist faction” through the National Alliance of Balik-
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Islam (NABI) (Banlaoi, 2007, p. 10). Mendoza notes that “the RSIM is the 
interplay of nationalist movement and fundamentalist”. There were socialist 
democrats who joined the BIM through the Balik-Islam Unity Congress (BIUC), 
which is considered the “nationalist Balik-Islam” (Mendoza, personal 
communication, April 3, 2008). 
3. Organizational Structure 
During the early years of its operation, the RSIM followed a clear 
organizational structure. Santos acted as the Amir, or the overall leader, the core 
members made up the central committee, and the remainder was broken into 
three groups in charge of special operations, special actions and security 
(Banlaoi, 2007, p. 8).  During their peak, the RSIM had an estimated strength of 
50 members, but latest Intelligence estimates suggest that there are 29 identified 
hard-core members, 13 full supporters and 11 on the watch list (AFP Intelligence 
Estimate, 2006, p. 27). RSIM operations are decentralized and 
compartmentalized, making membership difficult to track and detect below the 
leadership level. The RSIM is comprised of several loose cell groups from the 
different “Balik-Islam” front organizations throughout Luzon in the Northern 
Philippines, and in other areas in the central regions of the Philippines (Agustin, 
2005, p. 9). The organization also has strong links with other “Balik-Islam” 
organizations and other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that provide 
legal cover and support to the movement distributed throughout the Philippines 
(Agustin, 2005, p. 10). 
C. LEADERSHIP 
Ahmed Santos and Ruben Lavilla are the two prominent figures in the 
organization of the RSIM. Both were born into the Catholic faith, are well-
educated, come from middle class families, and are representative of young 
idealists emerging from non-traditional Muslim regions in the Philippines. Other 
key figures in the RSIM are former overseas contract workers who encountered 
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the teachings of Islam and converted while working in the Middle East, while 
others are former members of existing nationalist organizations within the 
Philippines.  
1. Ahmed Santos, the RSIM Founder 
Hilarion Del Rosario Santos was the founder and leader of the RSIM until 
his arrest in Zamboanga City in the Southern Philippines in October 2005. 
Santos was born as Hilarion Del Rosario Santos III on March 12, 1971 in Anda, 
Pangasinan in the Northern Philippines. Santos was the eldest of three brothers 
who were all raised by their grandfather, a former military officer. Their 
grandfather raised the Santos children with a strong Catholic upbringing (ICG 
Report, 2005, p. 6).  According to Santos, he was raised a “hard-core Catholic” 
and he is able to accurately cite passages from the Bible (personal 
communication, April 4, 2008). 
After completing high school and a short computer course in Manila, 
Santos attempted to join the U.S. Marines. After failing to obtain an enlistment, 
Santos signed up as an OFW to find work in Saudi Arabia. It was there in Saudi 
Arabia that Santos converted to the Islamic faith. When asked when he first 
encountered Islam, Santos related that information on Islam formed part of the 
program of the Saudi firms who hired the OFWs; this program conducted a “pre-
departure” briefing for incoming workers and gave indoctrination classes about 
Islam. Santos states, “It just took me three hours to embrace the Islam faith while 
in Saudi Arabia” (personal communication, April 4, 2008). From 1992 to 1993, 
Santos worked for Alkhatan, a contractor of ARAMCO, in the eastern province of 
Saudi Arabia. After his conversion, he spent two years, from 1993 to 1995, 
undergoing an educational orientation to Islam. During his studies, he met 
Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, the brother in law of Osama Bin Laden, who was 
responsible for establishing AQN networks within the Philippines (AFP Report on 
the Arrest of Santos, 2005). Upon his return to the Philippines, Santos joined an 
organization that called themselves “Islamic Studies Call and Guidance 
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(ISCAG),” a legitimate organization that solicits funds and donations from the 
Middle East for publications of religious materials and missionary work (ICG 
Report, 2005, p. 6). 
In 1995, Santos formed the Fi Sabillah Dawah and Media Foundation, Inc 
(FSDMFI) to propagate Islam (Special Report, Intelligence Service, AFP, 2006, 
p. 221). His exposure to the ISCAG and the Islamic Dawah Council of the 
Philippines (IDCO), particularly the radio programs, influenced Santos’ thoughts 
on Islam. Ahmad Gerapuso, the alleged founder of ISCAG, was responsible for 
befriending and recruiting Santos into the BIM (Mendoza, 2002, p. 116). 
It was in FSDMFI that Santos honed his skills at propagating Islam 
through his radio program. He bought airtime to broadcast his views at a regular 
time-spot on radio and television stations. This notoriety allowed him to establish 
contacts with the leaders of the MILF (ICG Report, 2005, p. 6). Santos admitted 
that he went to MILF camp to see Hashim Salamat, the MILF Founder and 
Chairman, but stressed that he “only went to the MILF camp as a plain journalist 
to conduct interview of top MILF leaders” (personal communication, April 4, 
2008). 
In 1999, Santos married his second wife Nurain Dongon, a convert from 
Cagayan de Oro City in Northern Mindanao. One of Nurain’s three sisters is 
married to Kadafi Janjalani, the ASG leader, while the other is married to Jainal 
Sali, the ASG’s second-in-command. The marriage of Santos to his second wife 
established familial links between the RSIM and the ASG (AFP Report on the 
Arrest of Santos, 2005, p. 1).  
After establishing a connection with the ASG, Santos went on a pilgrimage 
to Mecca in March 1999 and worked with the Islamic Wisdom Worldwide Mission 
(IWWM). With his contacts among different organizations established through his 
relationship with Khalifa, Santos gained access to funds for the expansion of his 
activities in the Philippines (ICG Report, 2005, p. 6). 
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2. Ruben Lavilla, RSIM Spiritual Adviser 
In 2001, Ruben Lavilla, an Ilongo (Filipino ethnic group from central 
Philippines), joined Santos in the RSIM and became their spiritual adviser. With a 
degree in Chemical Engineering from the University of the Philippines, Lavilla 
established his own connections in Saudi Arabia and in other countries in the 
Middle East. He is also a graduate of the University of Medina, where he 
specialized in Islamic jurisprudence, and trained with Kadafi Janjalani at the 
Darul Imam Shafi’ie Academy in Marawi City in 1992 (ICG Report, 2005, p. 7). 
Santos claims to have initially met Lavilla at the Indonesian Embassy in 
Makati City during a prayer session. After their initial meeting, Santos invited 
Lavilla to produce lectures for Santos’ radio program and to personally lead 
studies in Anda, Pangasinan (AFP Report on the Arrest of Santos, 2005, p. 15). 
Santos describes Lavilla, now known as Sheikh Omar Lavilla, as “well-educated 
and a very intelligent man” (personal communication, April 4, 2008). Banlaoi 
describes Lavilla as the “ideological beacon and the spiritual adviser of the 
RSIM”; he further describes Lavilla as an “urban mujahideen” (Banlaoi, personal 
communication, April 2, 2008). 
Lavilla is considered a strong advocate of Wahabism, and is believed to 
have taken part in the Chechen jihad. He is also the former president of the 
Islamic Studies Call and Guidance (ISCAG) in Cavite, and responsible for 
providing spiritual direction for RSIM members (NICA Report, 2007, p. 1). 
At present, AFP reports suggest that the RSIM is under the leadership of 
Ruben Lavilla, also known as Sheikh Omar Lavilla. Lavilla serves as the conduit 
of funds from the organizations in the Middle East, and is known as a “mufti”, an 
Islamic scholar who can interpret Shariah or the Islamic laws and issue verdicts 
(Special Report, AFP, 2006, p. 241).  
 28
3. Other RSIM Key Personnel 
Pio De Vera is one of the key RSIM members under the tutelage of 
Santos. He served as the Operations Officer of the RSIM until his arrest in 
December 2005 in Zamboanga City in the Southern Philippines (Debriefing 
Report on De Vera, AFP, 2005, p. 1). A bomb demolition expert, he was among 
the RSIM members initially arrested in Anda, Pangasinan in 2002. Prior to 
converting and joining the RSIM, De Vera was a member of the New People’s 
Army (NPA) (Banlaoi 2006, p. 7). 
Like Ahmed Santos, De Vera also worked in the Middle East as a contract 
worker. In 1995, he went to Saudi Arabia as an upholstery worker; through 
constant reading of Islamic leaflets, he converted to Islam and started attending 
prayer and preaching at the Da’awah Center in Riyadh. Other Filipino converts 
also assisted him in his studies of the Islamic faith. When he returned to the 
Philippines in 2001, De Vera met a Balik-Islam member and invited him to go to 
Anda, Pangasinan, where he met Ahmed Santos (Debriefing Report on De Vera, 
2005, p. 2). 
After the capture of Santos and De Vera in 2005, Dino Amor Pareja filled 
the leadership vacuum within the RSIM. Pareja focused his efforts on 
consolidating the remaining RSIM networks for reorganization and building up 
the organization for future operations. A demolition expert, Pareja is a graduate 
of the University of the Philippines in Cebu City (a major city in Central 
Philippines) and is known as the “right hand man” of Santos (Special Report, 
AFP, 2005, p. 241). 
Another key figure in the RSIM is Tyrone Santos, the brother of Ahmed 
and one of the original founders of the group. He is presently released on bail for 
a case of illegal possession of firearms and explosives after his arrest in 2004, 




house. Ricardo Ayeras, another bomb expert, is a key personality who was 
involved in the planned Operation “Big Bang” and is still at large (Debriefing 
Report on De Vera, 2005, p. 3). 
D. LINKAGES 
The RSIM has established ties with other radical terrorist groups through 
inter-marriages, personal contacts, training, and religious practices. The Muslim-
Christian conflict in the Southern Philippines is the one issue that allows the 
different groups to cooperate and maintain relationships with one another. Under 
JI instructors at MILF camps on Mindanao, RSIM and ASG members have 
undergone simultaneous training on how to conduct improvised explosive 
operations (Capuyan, 2005, p. 16). Besides training, these groups, along with 
NGOs from the Middle East, also provided financial and logistical support to 




















Source: AFP Presentation entitled “Knowing the Enemy”, 2005
 
 
Figure 1.   RSIM Linkages (From: AFP Presentation entitled Knowing the Enemy, 
2005) 
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The figure shows the connections between the RSIM, MILF and ASG.  It 
also highlights their connection to the different NGOs and personalities involved, 
illustrating personal connections and the flow of funding to and from the 
organizations. Santos’ link to the MILF is his personal connection with Salamat, 
while RSIM’s primary link to the ASG is through Lavilla’s connection to Janjalani. 
Of note is the fact that Santos is also married to the sister of Janjalani’s wife, 
creating a familial bond between the two groups. The FSDMFI of Santos and the 
Balik-Islam Unity Congress (BIUC) are the primary organizations providing 
support to the RSIM (Capuyan, 2005, p. 16).  
1. RSIM - ASG Connection 
Even before the RSIM was uncovered in 2002, there were already some 
Islamic converts who were members of the ASG. Jovenal Bruno, a convert and a 
veteran of the Soviet-Afghan war, was “considered to be the most intellectual of 
all Abu Sayyaf leaders” (Mendoza, 2005, p. 8). Mendoza (2005) notes that “it 
was the first time that a “Balik-Islamist” held a vital position in a known terrorist 
organization” (p. 8) Omar Lavilla’s educational ties with Kadafi Janjalani also 
established a link between the RSIM and the ASG. When their training camp in 
Anda was raided by Philippine authorities, Lavilla instructed RSIM members to 
“seek refuge in ASG lairs under Janjalani because the latter had offered to help 
Balik-Islam members on the run” (NICA Report, 2007, p. 3). 
In 1999, Santos married his second wife, Nurain (Loraine) Dungon, a 
convert from Cagayan de Oro in northern Mindanao. One of Nurain’s three 
sisters, Zinaib, was already married to ASG leader Kadafi Janjalani, while the 
other, Amina, was the wife of Jainal Sali/Abu Solaiman, the ASG spokesperson 
and second in command (ICG Report, 2005). These marriages created a familial 
bond between Santos, the RSIM, and the leaders of the Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG).  When police arrested Santos in October 2005, he was operating as the 
Chief of ASG Media Bureau. Among his possessions recovered were  
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propaganda materials and other documents from the ASG that clearly showed 
his involvement with ASG activities (Special Report on the Arrest of Santos, AFP, 
2005, p. 3).  
2. RSIM - MILF - JI- Connection 
 The RSIM established links with the MILF as early as 2001. Hashim 
Salamat, the founder and former MILF Chairman, reportedly provided financial 
and logistical support to the RSIM. Further, Salamat allowed RSIM members to 
train in bomb-making and other terrorist tactics with the JI in MILF camps at their 
Mindanao bases. Based on documents recovered by Philippine authorities, MILF 
Chairman Ahod Ibrahim, known as Al Haj Murad, provided Santos with a 
certificate of endorsement on April 7, 2000 to solicit funds for da’wah operations 
(Special Report, AFP, 2006, p. 244).  
After the raid of the RSIM camp in Anda in 2002, Santos advised RSIM 
members to hide in MILF-SOG (Special Operations Group) camps in Mindanao 
(NICA Report, 2007, p. 3). However, prior to this, AFP reports state that Santos 
had already attended training in MILF camps. Evidence of this was found in 
captured documents after an “all out war” was launched by the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines (AFP) against the MILF in 2000.  According to RSIM documents, 
and other materials seized by authorities from the facility at Anda and from the 
FSDMFI offices in Quezon City, there were letters from the MILF Vice-Chairman 
for Internal Affairs allocating support to the RSIM.  There were also records of 
MILF and RSIM personalities and transactions revealing that captured MILF-
SOG member Abdul Manap Mentang had links to Ahmed Santos and to other 
RSIM members (Special Report, AFP, 2006, p. 245).     
The RSIM has also established links with the regional terrorist network, 
Jemaah Islamiah. Santos, De Vera, Trinidad, Pareja, and other RSIM members 
joined the training conducted by the JI in March 2004 at MILF camps in 
Mindanao. JI instructors directed this training, which focused on demolition, 
explosives and weapons, and “kital jihad”, under the protection of the MILF 
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(NICA Report, 2007, p. 3).  Top JI operatives in the Philippines such as Fathur 
Roman Al Ghozi, Taufiq Refqi, Rohmat alias Zaki, and Zulikpli maintained 
relationships with Santos and the RSIM. When Philippine authorities arrested 
Refqi in Cotabato City in 2003, authorities recovered documents linking Santos 
and the RSIM to JI-planned bombing operations in various locations throughout 
the Philippines. Zaki, another well-known JI operative in the Philippines, was the 
primary instructor of RSIM members in the four-month explosives and demolition 
training in Mount Cararao, an MILF camp located in the boundary of the province 
of Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao in the Southern Philippines (Special Report, 
AFP, 2006, p. 244). 
The two primary suspects in the Bali bombings in 2002 also have links to 
Santos and the RSIM; Dulmatin and Omar Patek provided financial support for to 
bombing operations conducted against foreign nationals in Metro Manila during 
2005. In the article Suicide Terrorism in the Philippines, Rommel Banlaoi (2006) 
notes, “Santos confessed that he collaborated with Omar Patek , one of the key 
suspects in the 2002 Bali bombings while hiding in Mindanao in 2004” (p. 1).  
3. RSIM - Al Qaeda - Middle East Connection 
Ahmed Santos solidified his links with different Middle East organizations 
during his pilgrimage to Mecca in 1999 and while working with the Islamic 
Wisdom Worldwide Mission (IWWM). He was able to establish contact with 
Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, brother in law of Osama Bin Laden and head of the 
International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), who provided him funding to 
expand his organization (ICG Report, 2005, p. 7).  
The International Islamic Relief Organization (IRRO) was established in 
1978 as a humanitarian NGO based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. A branch 
commenced in Marawi City, Philippines in 1988. While Khalifa established the 
IRRO as a legitimate Islamic organization, authorities quickly suspected that it 
was providing covert support to radical groups within the region (Mendoza, 2005, 
p. 24). AFP Reports state that Muhammad Al-Ghafari, another Jordanian-
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Palestinian linked to Khalifa and head of the Islamic World Wide Mission 
Incorporated (IWWMI), provided funds to the RSIM through Ahmed Santos 
(Special Report, AFP, 2006, p. 246). 
E. FUNDING AND SUPPORT 
The RSIM received funding and support from various NGOs and other 
charitable institutions in the Middle East during its early days of inception. 
Santos’ link with Mohammad Jamal Khalifa enabled Santos to expand his 
organizations through funds intended for Muslim education and other charitable 
works in the Philippines. Since 1995, organizations such as the Islamic Studies 
Call and Guidance (ISCAG), the Islamic Foundation Center and the Islamic 
Wisdom Worldwide Mission (IWWM) have become conduits for funds going to 
the RSIM (Abuza, 2005, p. 36)3.The RSIM also received funding from the ASG 
and the JI. “Khadafi Janjalani, the ASG leader, reportedly gave Santos an 
amount equivalent to $200,000 to conduct operations in Metro Manila” (Banlaoi, 
2007, p. 10). In his interrogation report, Santos admitted that he received around 
$5,000 from a JI operative, Omar Patek, to use in the Manila bombing that 
planned to target U.S. nationals (Banlaoi, 2007, p. 10). Khadafi Janjalani also 
gave the RSIM an amount of 10 million ($200,000 U.S.) pesos through Sheik 
Omar Lavilla as ASG support to RSIM operations (Capuyan, 2005, p. 16). 
During an interview, Santos stated that he received funding from Middle 
Eastern NGOs that helped him expand his FSDMFI office in Cubao, Quezon 
City. However, he denied that he received financial support from Middle Eastern 
NGOs for the purpose of conducting terrorist operations (Santos, personal 
communication, April 4, 2008). 
                                            
3 Dr. Abuza is one of the leading regional experts regarding International terrorism within 
Southeast Asia. 
 34
F. OPERATIONS  
The ASG and the MILF-SOG were the main terrorists groups responsible 
for several high profile terrorist acts in the Philippines before the emergence of 
the RSIM. Filipino veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s were the 
primary leaders of the two organizations. Their experience and training in 
Afghanistan deeply indoctrinated them with radical interpretations on Islam. They 
committed themselves to Islamic jihad and the attainment of a Theocratic Islamic 
state in the Southern Philippines (Mendoza, 2005, p. 8). 
Mendoza describes this group as “the first generation of Muslim radicals in 
the Philippines”; some of these Afghan veterans were actually Islamic converts 
and members of the “Balik-Islam” movement. They joined the MILF or the ASG, 
and some of them later became members of the RSIM (Mendoza, personal 
communication, April 3, 2008). Other terrorist groups, such as the MILF-SOG 
and the ASG, then used the RSIM to conduct terrorist operations in Christian 
areas such as Metro Manila and other major cities in the Philippines. The RSIM 
proved useful in these missions because of their influence, mass base and 
knowledge of the area. DG (Director General), NICA, notes that “the RSIM is 
hard to distinguish from the rest”, rendering them effective support for any 
terrorist group wanting to conduct activities (DG, NICA, personal communication, 
April 3, 2008).  
1. Zamboanga City Bombing 
The involvement of Islamic converts in terrorist activities in the Philippines 
can be traced as early as 2001, when police authorities arrested two converts 
who staged a bombing in Zamboanga City in October 2001, killing 5 people. One 
of the arrested terrorists, identified as Marvin Geonzon, alias Abdulmakil 
Geonzon, admitted that he assembled the bomb; however, an ASG member 
planted the bomb at their designated target site (Mendoza, 2002, p. 119).  
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Geonzon was born as a Catholic and raised in Manila, but later embraced 
the Islamic faith after a failed marriage. He converted to Islam in 1997 under the 
influence of a Saudi national, went to school in order to study the Koran, and 
eventually settled at the RSIM training camp in Anda, Pangasinan. Geonzon left 
the RSIM camp in 1998, went to Zamboanga City in Mindanao, and fell into 
habitual drug use. He was arrested on drug related charges, and spent seven 
months in jail, where he met ASG members imprisoned with him. Geonzon 
established a relationship with the ASG members that lasted until the day he was 
released from prison. Two days after his release, a restaurant was bombed in the 
downtown Zamboanga. Geonzon was quickly brought into police custody after 
two witnesses identified him as one of the two individuals suspected in the 
bombing incident (Hookway, 2002, p. 3).   
2. Davao City Bombings  
In another incident on October 29, 2001, a convert was responsible for 
bombing the Office of the Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA) in 
Davao City. Rasul Fernandez from, Opol, Cagayan de Oro in northern Mindanao, 
also known as Ustadz Najib Rasul, was fatally wounded in the explosion inside 
the guestroom of the SPDA compound while he was adjusting the bomb 
(Mendoza, 2005). C/Supt Rodolfo Mendoza (2002) gives more background of 
Rasul in his paper, Philippine Jihad, Inc, noting that “he (Rasul) was a former 
pastor before he embraced Islam while he was working in Saudi Arabia” (p. 120). 
In March 2003, a bomb exploded in the International Airport at Davao City, 
killing 21 people and injuring 148 others (Banlaoi, 2007, p. 7). The bombing was 
carried out by two RSIM members identified as Ibrahim Kessel and Karim 
Ayeras, along with MILF-SOG members. Banlaoi (2007) suggests, “the terrorist 
attack was a graduation test for Kessel and Ayeras, who had just finished a 
bomb training in an MILF camp” (p. 7). The government blamed the bombing 
directly on the MILF because the existence of the RSIM was still unknown and 
the bomb had MILF-SOG trademarks (Banlaoi, 2007, p. 7).  
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3. MV Super Ferry 14 Bombing 
The MV Super Ferry 14 bombing on February 27, 2004 was conducted 
jointly by the RSIM and the ASG. Redento Cain Dellosa, the confessed bomber, 
is an Islamic convert who took responsibility for planting the bomb with an Abu 
Sayyaf member, Alhamser Manatad Limbong, alias Kosovo. Philippine 
authorities captured both bombers during an investigation of the attack. 
Authorities initially denied that the Super Ferry bombing, considered to be one of 
the worst maritime terrorist attacks in the Philippines, was a terrorist attack; 
however, investigation later revealed an RSIM-ASG connection to the incident 
(Banlaoi, 2007, p. 8 ). 
The incident ensured that the RSIM would gain notoriety in the national 
and international scene. Banlaoi (2007) notes, “The Super Ferry bombing was a 
milestone in the history of RSIM for it received a lot of international and domestic 
media attention” (p. 10). 
4. Valentine’s Day Bombing 
Simultaneous bombings in three major Philippine cities in the Philippines 
on February 14, 2005 showed the degree of coordination the RSIM was able to 
achieve. This incident provides another case of a combined RSIM-ASG terrorist 
attack. These incidents, known as the Valentine’s Day bombing, occurred in 
Makati Central Business District in Metro Manila, Davao City, and General 
Santos City in the Southern Philippines. The attacks caused the death of four 
people and wounded over a 100. The Makati City bombing was reportedly 
carried out by the RSIM on instructions of the ASG. Islamic convert and RSIM 
member, Angelo Trinidad (alias Abu Khalil) planted the bomb on the passenger 
bus with the aid of Gamal Baharan (alias Tapay), an ASG bomb expert operating 
in Metro Manila as part of the ASG Urban Terrorist Group (NICA Report, 2007, p. 
5). 
 37
The government eventually convicted Angelo Trinidad, Tapay Baharan 
and JI Rohmat Addurohim of murder and frustrated multiple murders in 
connection with the bombing in Makati and two other bombings in Davao City 
and General Santos City in Mindanao (NICA Report, 2007, p. 5). They received 
the death penalty. However, Ahmed Santos stressed that the Valentine’s Day 
bombing was the sole handiwork of the ASG. Santos claims that Khalil Trinidad 
received instructions directly from Abu Solaiman, the ASG’s second-in-
command, and not from the RSIM (AFP Report on the Arrest of Santos, 2005). 
Santos further offered that “Trinidad could not defy the order because he was 
already an ASG member” and that on three different occasions, “he (Santos) 
tried to dissuade Trinidad from carrying out the plan because it would 
compromise his own plan” (p. 15). The Director General of the National 
Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) further notes, “The ASG used the RSIM 
in the Valentine’s Day bombing operations in Manila for their own purposes” (DG, 
NICA, personal communication, April 2, 2008).  
5. Operation “Big Bang” or “Great Ibadah” 
In March 2005, Philippine authorities prevented a major terrorist plot of the 
ASG-RSIM with the capture of an RSIM member identified as Tyrone Dave 
Santos. During the raid, authorities recovered ten sacks (600kg) of explosive 
materials at an RSIM safe house in Quezon City. The terrorists’ plan was 
supposedly to be carried out during Lenten season; exploding the bombs in 
areas frequented by American nationals throughout Manila (Banlaoi, 2006, p. 1). 
The terrorists envisioned that the operation, codenamed “Operation Big 
Bang,” would produce results similar to the Indonesian Bali bombing. The 
operation would utilize a “truck bomb” to target the L.A. Café’, a popular nightspot 
in Malate and one of Manila’s tourist districts (ICG Report, 2005, p. 17). During 
his interrogation, Pio De Vera admitted that Ahmed Santos asked him to prepare 
a car bomb with a maximum capacity of one thousand kilos of explosives to  
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bomb a target frequented by foreign nationals. He further revealed that the 
operation would be a suicide bombing or a martyrdom operation of the RSIM 
(Debriefing Report on De Vera, AFP, 2005, p. 4). 
6. Other RSIM Terror Activities 
Aside from directly participating in bombing operations, RSIM members 
provided safe houses and other logistical support to ASG members in Metro 
Manila and other Christian areas in the Philippines. Jayve Ofrasio, a Balik-Islam 
convert, was arrested in Belfast, Ireland in January 2004 on suspicion of 
providing support to the ASG and JI operatives (Capuyan, 2005, p. 17). In his 
article Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf, Zachary Abuza (2005) 
notes that “he (Ofrasio) provided a safe house for Tauriq Riefqi, an Indonesian JI 
operative in Cotabato and Zulkipli, another top JI operative in the Philippines, and 
was arrested in 2003 as he tried to enter Malaysia using a passport in the name 
of Dani Ofrasio” (p. 37). 
The RSIM also provided a safe house for JI operative, Fathur Roman Al 
Ghozi, when he escaped from his detention cell at the National Police 
Headquarters in Camp Crame, Metro Manila in July 2003 (Agustin, 2005, p. 10). 
Philippine authorities eventually killed Al Ghozi when they tried to apprehend him 
in Mindanao a few days after his escape. 
Since the arrest of Santos in 2005, the RSIM has been forced to focus on 
reorganization and recruitment. As a result, members have avoided high profile 
terrorist activities in order to regenerate their organizational infrastructure. From 
2005 to 2007, the RSIM, devoid of its key leaders, did not carry out any activities 
of significance. On October 19, 2007, the RSIM suddenly reemerged in the 
spotlight as Omar Lavilla claimed responsibility for the Glorietta bombing in the 
heart of the Makati business district. Even though extensive investigations ruled 
out the possibility of a terrorist attack, the RSIM was resurrected in the minds of 
the Filipino people (Banlaoi, 2007, p. 13). 
 39
G. CURRENT ASSESSMENT 
Banlaoi (2007) remarks, “Philippine law enforcement and security 
authorities stressed that the RSIM is the newest threat facing the Philippines 
today” (p. 16). The RSIM is an emerging concern due to its ties with other 
terrorist groups such as the ASG, the JI and other rouge elements of the MILF. 
Banlaoi further observes that “the RSIM is having internal organizational 
problems, and RSIM remnants are more aggressive and daring than the ASG 
members” (p. 17). NICA Director General stressed that “the RSIM is still a threat 
because RSIM has a more direct link with Al Qaeda than the other terrorist 
groups in the country” (DG, NICA, personal communication, April 2, 2008).  
On the other hand, top military intelligence officials described the RSIM 
with less temerity: “…after the arrest of Santos in 2005, they are no longer a 
threat, and nothing compared to the communist New People’s Army (NPA)” (top 
military intelligence officer, personal communication, April 3, 2008). Rodolfo 
Mendoza claims that the “RSIM was believed to be disbanded in 2005 after the 
arrest of Santos, and the different major bombing activities in the country were no 
longer RSIM but solely ASG guided operations” (Mendoza, personal 
communication, April 3, 2008).   
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IV. THE RSIM AS A THREAT: AN ANALYSIS 
Some Philippine security experts claim that following the arrests of key 
RSIM leaders, including that of Ahmed Santos in 2005, RSIM no longer 
represents a major terrorist concern. Philippine government estimates state, “The 
capability of the group to wage terrorism has been effectively checked and 
contained” (AFP Intelligence Estimate, 2006, p. 30). However, other experts and 
government officials believe that as long as the number of Filipino Christians 
converts to Islam continues to grow, and the Moro issue remains in the south, the 
threat of groups like RSIM will remain. Social movements in the Philippines, like 
others throughout the world, typically experience an ebb and flow pattern within 
their life cycles. Because the environment within the Philippines remains 
unchanged and the ingredients to create a dangerous radical group remain, few 
analysts would be surprised if a radical RSIM-like group eventually reemerged 
and surpassed RSIM’s previous strength in terms of size and operations. 
Drawing on McAdam’s political process model discussed earlier, we now 
focus our analysis of the rise of the RSIM. As McAdam notes, three broad sets of 
factors must fall into place before a social movement can emerge: expanding 
political opportunities, increased indigenous organizational strength and the 
development of an insurgent consciousness. It is to a discussion of these factors 
that we now turn. 
A. EXPANDING POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES  
As noted earlier, political opportunities include “any event or broad social 
process that serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the 
political establishment is structured” (McAdam, 1982, p. 41). These can include 
(but are not limited to) “wars, industrialization, international political realignments, 
prolonged unemployment, and widespread demographic change” (McAdam, 
1982, p. 41). Nevertheless, we need to be cautious in our use and identification 
of “political opportunities.” As Gamson and Meyer (1996) have warned, “[t]he 
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concept of political opportunity structure is in trouble, … It threatens to become 
an all-encompassing fudge factor for all the conditions and circumstances that 
form the context for collective activism. Used to explain much, it may ultimately 
explain nothing at all” (p. 273). Thus, in the present instance, we need to show 
how specific changes in the external environment (i.e., external to RSIM) 
provided RSIM the opportunity to mobilize. 
1. Christian Migration to Mindanao 
“The Muslim secessionist movement was caused by economic, political 
and social marginalization of the earlier inhabitants of Mindanao as a result of the 
continued migration of Christians” (Morales, 2003, p. 35). This demographic 
change caused a major conflict between the new Christian settlers and the 
Muslim natives of the Southern Philippines. From less than a million Christian 
migrants in 1948, movement increased to 2.3 million in 1970; by 1990, the 
Muslim population in Mindanao was only 17 percent, and about 5 percent in the 
entire Philippines (McKenna, 2003, p. 1). 
Thomas McKenna (2003) notes that the “Christian migrations to Muslim 
Mindanao caused inevitable dislocations…also produced glaring disparities 
between Christian settlers and Muslim farmers” (p. 1). From the Commonwealth 
period through the administrations following the Philippine independence, the 
government developed a major economic program that benefited Christian 
settlers. These settlers, who possess better education and more political 
influence, received titles on their lands as well as better government support than 
the original Muslim settlers in the region (McKenna, 2003, p. 2). 
During the HUK rebellion, then Defense Secretary Ramon Magsaysay 
worked through his “All Out Friendship or All Out Force” strategy to provide lands 
for HUK guerillas who surrendered to the government. Magsaysay also assisted 
other Christian settlers in Mindanao through the Economic Development Corps 
(EDCOR), which administered socio-economic development during the Anti-HUK  
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period (Pena, 2007, p. 37). Leonardo Pena (2007) remarks that the “EDCOR 
project became the answer to counter the HUK slogan of ‘land for the landless’” 
(p. 38). 
Since the HUK rebellion, land issues between Muslims and Christians led 
to violence between the two groups, later resulting in the formation of the Muslim 
secessionist movement. 
2. The Moro Conflict 
The rise of student activism and the political awakening of student sectors 
in major colleges and universities in the early 1970s helped contribute to the 
political instability of the Philippine government, thereby expanding the political 
opportunities available to various Muslim secessionist movements in the 
Philippines. As urbanization dramatically increased, student activism emerged in 
the metro area; at the same time, international events abroad showcased 
students influencing their own local governments. The University of the 
Philippines, one of the leading educational institutions in the country, became the 
birthplace of the Muslim secessionist movement ideology. Nur Misuari, a young 
Muslim professor from the university, organized the Moro National Liberation 
Front (MNLF) as an “instrument for the liberation of the Moro nation” (Santos, 
2005, p. 2). Indeed, Misuari became a symbol for the “free and independent state 
of the Bangsa Moro people in Mindanao” (Santos, 2005, p. 1). Inspired by both 
the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) of the late 1960s and the alleged 
1968 “Jabidah Massacre” (Gloria & Vitug, 2000, pp. 2-23), Filipino Muslims 
engaged in student activism and other major protest actions against the 
government. Thomas McKenna (2000) notes that the “Jabidah Massacre had a 
galvanizing effect on the Muslim student community in Manila” (p. 141). The 
ideological foundations of other prominent Muslim scholars, such as Hashim 
Salamat (who later founded the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and whose 
teachings became the basis of RSIM’s fundamentalist ideology), were formed 
through their education in the Middle East. During the 1960s and 1970s, several 
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Filipino Muslims, including Salamat, received scholarship grants in Egypt as part 
of Gamel Nasser’s education program, and most studied at the Al-Azhar 
University in Cairo (McKenna, 2000, p. 141). 
3. The Philippine Economy and the OFW Program 
The decline in the Philippine economy that began in the 1970s and 
continues to the present day helped fuel (and continues to fuel) political unrest, 
not only in Mindanao, but also in urban centers across the country (Magno & 
Gregor, 1986, p. 506). An increase in poverty and a general lack of employment 
opportunities resulted in mass dissatisfaction with the government. Radical 
organizations drew their leaders from the ranks of these discontented Filipinos, 
including figures within the various “Balik-Islam” organizations and their radical 
RSIM offshoot. These poor economic conditions persist in the Philippines, and 
the current state of affairs remains a grievance for Filipinos seeking better 
opportunities. 
Because the Philippine economy continues to rely on the exportation of 
labor, Saudi Arabia remains the primary destination for Filipino workers (Go, 
2005, p. 4). The Philippines’ dependence on the dollar remittances of its 
overseas workers further exposes the country to the continuous influx of Islamic 
converts, who mostly return to their homes in Metro Manila and other Christian 
areas in northern and central Philippines (ICG Report, 2005, p. 4). 
Technological advancement and industrialization also contributed to the 
growth of BIM movements such as RSIM. In response to economic deprivation, 
many Filipinos, including Muslims from Mindanao, migrated from rural areas to 
major urban centers, leading to further increases in the unemployment rate and 
exasperations of political unrest. Other economic conditions, such as the 
perceived hegemony of elites in major economic infrastructures, the unequal 
distribution of wealth and the exploitation of resources, contributed to this 
situation as well. Interestingly, not only did the weak Philippine economy lead to  
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political unrest, but it also led a number of Filipino workers to travel to the Middle 
East through the Overseas Foreign Workers (OFW) program, a number of whom 
returned to their homes as Islamic converts (ICG Report, 2005, p. 4). 
B. INCREASED INDIGENOUS ORGANIZATIONAL STRENGTH 
Isolated from other factors, expanding political opportunities do not give 
rise to social movements. Other necessary contributing factors may include 
resources needed to mobilize and sustain the cause.  As noted above, resources 
may consist of increased education and wealth within the aggrieved population or 
access to the wealth of sympathetic (and often international) supporters. Strong, 
indigenous organizations play key roles as well because they contribute five 
resources that are necessary for the development of a social movement: 
members, leaders, solidary incentives, communication networks and enterprise 
tools. As the following discussion illustrates, the Moro conflict, the OFW program 
and the BIM movement all contributed to the rise of RSIM by providing a pool of 
potential converts (i.e., members), by creating a sense of solidarity among like-
minded individuals, by training and educating future leaders, and by developing 
the social (communication) networks needed to facilitate the diffusion of the 
movement’s ideology. 
1. Members 
Social movements do not arise from unorganized groups or isolated 
individuals but rather from existing organizations that share similar interests, 
grievances and/or experiences (Smith, 1991, p. 60). BIM’s various legitimate, 
preexisting organizations (with an estimated membership of 200,000) provided 
RSIM a pool of potential recruits (Banlaoi, 2006, p. 1). As noted previously, 
Ahmed Santos himself is a former member of Islamic Studies Call and Guidance 
(ISCAG), a legal BIM organization established in 1991 with the objective of 
soliciting Saudi donations for charitable institutions in the Philippines (ICG 
Report, 2005, p. 6). Other prominent members of the RSIM came from legitimate 
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BIM organizations such as the Balik-Islam Unity Congress (BIUC) and the 
Islamic Information Center (IIC), as well as other BIM organizations scattered 
throughout the country (Mendoza, 2005, pp. 20-34). A majority of RSIM and BIM 
members originated from the pool of Overseas Filipino Workers who worked in 
the Middle East. Ahmed Santos, key leaders and most RSIM members were 
former overseas workers who converted to Islam during their stay in the Middle 
East or upon their return to the Philippines. Inter-marriages and personal ties 
further helped BIM and RSIM grow. 
2. Established Structure of Solidary Incentives  
The hope of a better life and the improvement of their social, political and 
economic status was a primary motivation for Filipinos converting to Islam 
(Villaviray, 2003, p. 4). Social disappointments may encourage people to convert. 
As Rodolfo Mendoza describes it, “Filipinos are fond of searching for new 
horizons and they are naturally very religious. It is no surprise that they are 
turning to religion to escape the disappointments in life” (Mendoza, 2005, p. 2). 
Mendoza further argues that the Philippines became the breeding ground for 
radicals because of poverty, injustice and the failure of the government to 
effectively deal with these problems. It is important to note that these 
inducements to conversion have no basis in social or educational status because 
frustrations with the existing social system are not limited to any specific class or 
educational level (Villaviray, 2003, p. 4).  Aside from poverty and other economic 
stresses, some Filipinos converted to Islam in response to frustration with their 
former religious traditions. Joey Ledesma, a member of a wealthy Philippine and 
the spokesperson of the Balik-Islam Unity Congress (BIUC), converted to Islam 
after growing dissatisfied with Roman Catholicism (Special Report, pcij.org, 
2003). Islam, like many other religions, promises life in paradise, and many 
people felt drawn to this promise. Villaviray (2003) notes that “according to the 
Koran, a good Muslim will be rewarded after death with a huge marble palace 
and virgins and young boys to attend to him” (p. 2).  
 47
The use of religion, specifically Islam, allows BIM organizations to 
organize and motivate its members.  Christian Smith (1996) asserts, “Perhaps 
the most potent motivational leverage that a social-movement can enjoy is the 
alignment of its cause with the ultimacy and sacredness associated with God’s 
will, eternal truth, and the absolute moral structure of the universe” (p. 9). Such 
an alignment has allowed RSIM to motivate Filipinos Muslims in a manner that 
has enabled feverous and uncompromising support from some of its members.  
By convincing members to broaden their support and participation in BIM 
organizations to that of RSIM (under the premise of carrying out Allah’s word), 
RSIM is able to forgo the costs of establishing incentives for participation.     
3. Communication Networks 
McAdam (1982) describes a social movement’s ideology as a “new 
cultural item subject to the same pattern of diffusion and adoption as other 
innovations” (p. 47). Existing communication networks provide a means for an 
insurgency to propagate its message to potential members (Smith, 1991, p. 60). 
The RSIM relied on the different communication networks to expand their 
influence and organization. Santos used BIM organizations to recruit potential 
members of the RSIM. He also established links with Middle East NGOs for 
support. Rodolfo Mendoza observes that the “RSIM has a more direct link with 
the different organizations in the Middle East than the other terrorist groups in the 
Philippines and that the OFW is the main support network of the Balik-Islam 
organizations in the country” (personal communication, April 4, 2008). The RSIM 
also used its ties with the MILF and the ASG for training and other logistical 
elements necessary for the growth of the organization. Omar Lavilla’s tie with 
Janjalani also increased the capability and operational reach of the RSIM. On the 
other hand, the Director General of NICA describes the RSIM as “having a 
stronger tie with the Al Qaeda Networks (AQN) than the JI, while the ASG and 
the MILF has stronger ties with the JI” (personal communication, April 2, 2008).  
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Insurgent groups can also use the media to promote the organization, as 
did RSIM. Ahmed Santos, a media practitioner himself, drew on his media 
networks to expand RSIM. He established his own media organization, and then 
used his radio program to propagate his teachings and to attract public sympathy 
and support. The 2007 Glorietta bombing in Makati City (Metro Manila’s Business 
district) offers a good example of the role that the media played in resurrecting 
RSIM’s name, when after Santos’s arrest, the organization was no longer 
considered a major threat (Banlaoi, 2007, p. 1). Although Philippine authorities 
ruled out the influence of terrorism in the incident, the media helped RSIM 
resurface in the minds of the people, preparing fertile ground for future 
propaganda efforts. 
4. Leaders 
Social movements need people who provide strategic direction, make 
decisions, articulate the movement’s interests and take the initiative in 
accomplishing the movement’s goal (Smith, 1991, p. 60). Well-educated and 
charismatic leaders played key roles in the rise of various Philippine social 
movements. Nur Misuari and Hashim Salamat, the charismatic leaders of the 
MNLF and the MILF, provided inspiration for the struggle of many Filipino Islamic 
movements, including BIM. In the case of RSIM, Ahmed Santos and Omar 
Lavilla operated as the central figures in the movement. Santos supplied overall 
leadership while Lavilla supervised RSIM’s religious and ideological direction 
(Special Report, AFP, 2006, p. 241). Both are well educated, draw on a wide 
network of support from both international and local sources, and possess the 
charisma to lead and motivate the group’s members.   
With the capture of Santos and other key sub-leaders in 2005, RSIM has 
experienced a leadership vacuum, and the operations and networks of the RSIM 
have been largely disrupted (Special Report, AFP, 2006, p. 241). Because RSIM 
is a leader-centered organization and its operations were centered on Santos, its 
operational activities and capabilities have been fragmented, which is why many 
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believe that the organization was effectively deactivated in 2006 (Banlaoi, 2007, 
p. 1). However, Lavilla, who is still at large, possesses the influence and 
capability to resurrect RSIM if he is able to garner financial support and the social 
conditions remain in the same state as they are today. Although there is no 
indication that RSIM is presently engaged in any operational activities, Rodolfo 
Mendoza argues that the “RSIM clearly has a capacity to re-emerge” (personal 
communication, April 4, 2008).  
5. Other Factors 
OFW remittances are one of the biggest inputs to the Philippine economy. 
In 2006, 12.8 billion remittances were recorded, an increase of 19.4 percent from 
the previous year. In 2007, this number grew to a record 14.45 billion (Dumlao, 
2008, p. 1). Based on the report of the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central bank 
of the Philippines), the increase in OFW remittances are due to the extended and 
continuous deployment of Filipino workers overseas. On average since 2006, 
OFW remittances have been over one billion dollars each month (GMA News 
Research, 2007, p. 1). 
External support to BIM related projects can be traced back to financial 
support from Saudi affiliated individuals and organizations. One such 
organization is the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO). The IIRO was 
the primary Muslim NGO that provided support to Muslim organizations in the 
Philippines from 1995 until its closure in 2001. Khalifa, who headed the IIRO, 
established several organizations in the Philippines, including the Al-Makdum 
University in Zamboanga, which provided student scholarships and charitable 
support to displaced Muslims. Unfortunately, in addition to these legitimate 
activities, the IIRO also channeled funding to terrorist groups operating within the 
Philippines (Abuza, 2003, p. 5).   
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C. COGNITIVE LIBERATION (INSURGENT CONSCIOUSNESS) 
What motivates an individual to join a movement?  Why does an individual 
join and fight for a cause? Christian Smith (1996) notes that it is a natural 
tendency for individuals to feel some degree of regret, disappointment, frustration 
and guilt if they see some violation of an individual’s basic rights. Some react to 
such injustices by simply accepting them, others by openly opposing them, and 
still others by taking an active role in stopping or attempting to correct them 
(Smith, 1996, p. 134). “Social movements represent this kind of action, where 
people’s sense of what is right and just is so seriously violated that they feel 
compelled not only to express disapproval but to organize to set things right” 
(Smith, 1996, p. 134). Nevertheless, it takes more than a set of grievances to 
motivate a group of people to do something about perceived (real or imagined) 
injustices. Individuals must develop a collective sense that together they can do 
something about their shared situation. They must develop what Smith (1991) 
calls an “insurgent consciousness,” “a collective state of understanding which 
stems from the subjective interpretation of the objective social situation in which 
a potential movement group finds itself” (p. 62). “It is a state of being which 
perceives, interprets, and explains a social situation in such a way that compels 
people to collectively organize and act to change that social situation” (McAdam, 
1982, p. 51).  
The rise of Islamic converts and the RSIM are a direct result of a people’s 
desire to fight against the perceived neglect and oppression of Filipino Muslims 
at the hands of the dominant Christian population. Four decades of Moro conflict 
and centuries of struggle for self-determination helped to create this “injustice 
frame,” which has become an inspiration for Philippine Islamic converts. They 
identify with these Filipino Muslims, whom they see as victims of injustice, 
oppression, government neglect and other social injustices inherent in the 
Philippine political, social and economic environment. The resulting insurgent 
consciousness was further reinforced by the sense of solidarity arising out of  
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conflicts in the Middle East, Iraq, Bosnia and other parts of the world. For 
instance, the Director General of NICA notes that the “war in Iraq influenced the 
radicalization of the Filipinos” (personal communication, April 2, 2008). 
1. The Moro Conflict 
The Moro conflict in Mindanao provided the ideological basis for the birth 
and growth of Islamic converts and the RSIM (Banlaoi, 2007, p. 2). Soliman 
Santos, Jr. (2005) describes the conflict as the “clash between two imagined 
nations or nationalism” (p. 1). He describes the foundational causes of the Moro 
conflict as: (1) economic marginalization; (2) political domination; (3) physical 
insecurity; (4) threatened Moro and Islamic identity; (5) perception that the 
government is the principal party to blame; and (6) perception of hopelessness 
under the present establishment (Santos, 2005, p. 2). 
Santos capitalized on these opportunities to “further his goal of 
propagating the true essence of Islam and to correct misconceptions about Islam 
and Muslims” (ICG Report, 2005, p. 6). He envisioned establishing an Islamic 
community on his own property in the Northern Philippines where, like the MILF’s 
Camp Abu Bakar in Mindanao, Muslims could practice the true teachings of 
Islam (personal communication, April 4, 2008). Santos used his organization as a 
legal cover while effectively using print and media outlets to promote Wahabbism 
and preach the need for jihad to obtain Islamic purifications within BIM 
communities (Banlaoi, 2007, p. 5). 
The Moro conflict also helped established Santos and RSIM’s link to 
Muslim groups such as the MILF and the ASG, who are advocating for an 
independent Islamic state of the Southern Philippines (Banlaoi, 2007, p. 2). The 
alleged abuses committed against Muslims in the Philippines and throughout the 
world became the rallying point in recruitment and propagation of Islamic 




Mindanao’s natural resources by Christian elites and the lack of concern and 
representation in the central government are still major grievances that Santos 
formerly decried in propaganda efforts aimed at attracting possible recruits. 
2. The Philippine Economy and the OFW Program 
As discussed above, a stagnant Philippine economy led to a lack of 
employment opportunities and an increase in Filipinos living below the poverty 
line, thus resulting in mass dissatisfaction with the government. Magno and 
Gregor (1986) note that the “economy of the Philippines has collapsed into a 
negative growth” (p. 506), and that these “economic dislocations” produced 
structural imbalances that were exploited by radical groups (Magno & Gregor, 
1986, p. 506). Other economic conditions, such as the perceived hegemony of 
elites in major economic infrastructures, unequal distribution of wealth and 
exploitation of resources, added the basic grievances that attract people to join 
social movements (Magno & Gregor, 1986, p. 506).  Unfortunately, these 
economic conditions are still present in the Philippines and remain a source of 
grievance for Filipinos seeking better opportunities. 
3. Peace Talks 
As noted above, the on-ongoing peace talks between the MILF and the 
Philippine government represent a major concern for the Muslim population in 
the Philippines. If the current negotiations solve the Moro issue, the threat of 
terrorist attacks from radical groups such as the RSIM will fade. However, 
several years have passed since the initial negotiations began in 1997, and the 
issues of “ancestral domain” and the “establishment of a system of life and 
governance suitable and acceptable to the Bangsa Moro people” (Santos, 2005, 
p. 18) continue to be hotly debated topics. The MILF claims that the “insincerity 
of the Arroyo regime is the main obstacle to the conclusion of a comprehensive 
peace agreement in Mindanao with the Government of the Philippines (GRP)” 
(Canana, 2008, p. 1).  A failure in the on-going peace process will fuel the fire of 
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discontent, so to speak, increasing rather than diminishing the insurgent 
consciousness of RSIM-type groups. Failure would increase the perception of 
“religious discrimination” and violence directed at Muslims, such as the alleged 
killing of a Muslim family in a military operation carried out in Sulu, Philippines. 
This specific event led to an MNLF attack on a military camp as retribution for the 
incident, which then escalated into a major armed conflict during March 2005 
(International Religious Freedom Report 2005, U.S. State Department). Filipino 
Muslims often claim that the government’s counterterrorist operations unfairly 
target Islamic schools, mosques and other Muslim communities, considering 
them terrorist havens. “Every time a bomb explodes in Mindanao or Metro 
Manila, the police always make Muslim communities potential targets of 
discriminatory raids” (Special Report, The Manila Times, 2004, p. 1). A failure in 
the on-going peace process could further solidify support for radical leaders by 
granting the cause a seemingly warranted grievance against the government.    
4. Ideological Formation 
Nur Misuari and Hashim Salamat, two of the most educated Filipino 
Muslims leaders of the Muslim secessionist movement, have greatly influenced 
the rise of the Muslim conflict. Misuari studied at the University of the Philippines 
during the time when student activism was at its peak in the fight against the 
Marcos administration (Santos, 2005, p. 4). Misuari was a recipient of a 
government scholarship through the Commission on National Integration (CNI), a 
program aimed at providing quality education to young and deserving Muslim 
students. While studying in Manila, Misuari experienced a strong anti-Muslim 
culture, which resulted in his frustrations against the existing Christian dominated 
institutions (McKenna, 2003, p. 3). His experience is not an isolated one; 
McKenna (2003) observes that, “by 1968, the CNI scholarship program had 
unintentionally created a group of young Muslim intellectuals schooled in political 
activism” (p. 6). 
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Similarly, Hashim Salamat received a scholarship in the Middle East at the 
Al-Azhar University in Egypt. During his stay at the university, Salamat was the 
Secretary-General of the Organization of Asian Students, and his thoughts were 
highly influenced by the ideas of Muslim Brotherhood leader Syed Qutb (Ressa, 
2003, p. 125). Salamat is more inclined to fundamentalist ideology and 
orientation, and this constitutes his main difference with Misuari, who is more 
secular and nationalist in his thinking (Santos, 2005, p. 4). Salamat’s 
contemporaries at the university in Cairo contributed to his ideological formation. 
Among them were Burhanuddin Rabanni and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, prominent 
leaders of the Muslim mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghanistan war (ICG Report, 
2004, p. 3).  
Abdurajak Janjalani, the founder of the ASG, also contributed to the 
development of BIM and RSIM ideology. Janjalani’s religious training in Libya in 
1988, at which time he met Jovinal Bruno, an Islamic convert who later joined the 
ASG, and their subsequent participation in the Soviet-Afghan war, provided the 
foundation for the fundamentalist thoughts of the radical BIM (Mendoza, 2005, p. 
9). The ASG, originally named Al-Harakat-al-Islamiya (Islamic Movement), chose 
as its primary objective the establishment of an independent Islamic state in the 
Southern Philippines, the same objective for which Ahmed Santos and the RSIM 
are laboring (ICG Report, 2008, p. 7). 
Finally, both Ahmed Santos and Omar Lavilla received their educational 
training in the Middle East. Lavilla is a graduate of the Islamic University of 
Medina where he specialized in figh (Islamic jurisprudence), and Santos 
underwent the Saudi daawa activity conducted by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, 
Endowments, Propagation and Guidance. This agency also manages outreach 
programs for non-Muslim residents in Saudi Arabia (ICG Report, 2005, p. 4). The 
teachings and ideological thoughts of Salamat and other MILF leaders later 
supplemented these educational experiences when Santos established links with 
the MILF, the ASG and other terrorist groups. 
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5. Government Programs and Actions 
President Marcos’s declaration of martial law in 1972 as a response to the 
Muslim secessionist movements resulted in an open rebellion by the MNLF. This, 
in turn, was followed by a series of military campaigns by the Philippine 
government (Santos, 2005, p. 9). These all-out wars against the MNLF during the 
1970s and against the MILF in 2000, along with other oppressive actions directed 
at Muslim secessionist groups, provided political opportunities for the growth of 
the BIM and the RSIM (ICG Report, 2005, p. 7). An ICG Report published in 
2005 disclosed that one of the immediate objectives of the RSIM operations in 
2002 was “to divert military attention from the Basilan based ASG” (p. 7) and 
served as retaliation for the AFP’s military offensive in Mindanao MILF camps.  
6. Framing of Issues 
Radical leaders have effectively framed their ideology to resonate with the 
concerns of BIM members. Though many members undergo training and 
education at various institutions, groups cannot reasonably expect that all 
potential members will have a formal education adequate for fully understanding 
the group’s ideology. In order to overcome this obstacle, group leaders reduce 
their message to generalized snippets of the ideology so that they may easily 
repeat the core beliefs to the public through their followers (Robinson, 2004, p. 
129). Robinson (2004) compares this tactic to using popular “bumper sticker” 
versions of ideology to resonate with the desires of the target audience. This is 
clearly evident in the continued reference to issues of “ancestral domain” and 
“self determination,” which radical groups use to shape the Moro-conflict debate. 
Another case in point is RSIM’s moniker, which draws its name from Rajah 
Solaiman, a Filipino Muslim ruler of Manila before the Spanish conquest in the 
15th century who many believe to be a grandson of the Sultan of Brunei and a 
scion of the Bornean dynasty (ICG Report, 2005, p. 3). However, as Banlaoi 
(2006) points out, “Rajah Solaiman was a Spanish collaborator during the 
Spanish period, unlike his other Muslim brothers in the Southern Philippines. 
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Thus, organizing a Muslim liberation movement in his honor is an apparent 
contradiction” (p. 17)  Nonetheless, most aggrieved individuals living in a Manila 
slum are not particularly precise about history, and by framing the issue using a 
historic figure upon which a new narrative of rebellion could be constructed, 
Ahmed Santos exhibited a keen understanding of what is needed to foment 
discord in Philippine society. 
D. CONCLUSION 
As illustrated above, RSIM capitalized on the existence of the factors 
McAdam insists must be present for a social movement to emerge. The 
expanding political opportunities afforded through the Moro conflict, the rise in 
participation in the OFW program, and political unrest laid the groundwork for the 
creation and expansion of BIM. With abundant resources available, RSIM 
founders used the pool of potential members, external support developed 
through international interactions, advances in technology and media and the 
solidary created through education and training to carve out a group of like-
minded individuals—RSIM.  All of these factors solidified with the insurgent 
consciousness created through the framing of grievances and formation of a 
radical ideology perceived as necessary to achieve the organization’s goals.  
These factors have been decades in the making, and a short-term solution for 
just one of these environmental conditions or grievances is unlikely to be 
achieved easily. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The RSIM, which represents a small but radical fundamentalist group 
within the broader social milieu of the Islamic converts in the Philippines, 
advocates for the conversion of the entire country to Islam. RSIM figured 
prominently in several high profile terrorist attacks in recent years; specifically, 
RSIM worked closely with the ASG in bombing operations in Metro Manila and 
other major urban centers in the country, as well as provided the necessary 
support in carrying out these terrorist attacks. 
After a series of counter-terrorism successes by Philippine authorities in 
recent years, the RSIM in mid-2008 may not appear at first glance to pose a 
significant threat to the security of the Philippines. However, if the social factors 
for its initial emergence are considered, it is clear that the RSIM is still a major 
concern for the Philippine government in the future because the major issues for 
its emergence and growth are still present in Philippine society. The main 
political, social and economic problems that gave rise to the radicalization of 
some Islamic converts remain largely unchanged. Despite the arrests of key 
leaders in 2005 and the subsequent disruption of its organization and networks, 
the emergence of new radical groups within the growing “Balik-Islam” 
organizations remains a genuine possibility. Since government counter-terrorism 
efforts focus primarily on hunting individual leaders, the social, political and 
ideological causes of terrorism have not changed. Any new batch of radicals that 
might emerge from the residual group of militant Islamic converts would be 
capable of conducting attacks similar to the Super Ferry 14 bombing, the 
Valentine’s Day bombing and other suicide terrorist operations. If they follow 
Ahmed Santos’s model, they will be able to generate funding from the Middle 
East, and, like RSIM, the door will be open to established alliances with other 
terrorist groups such as the ASG and the JI. 
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Given the fact that the Philippine economy continues to rely on labor 
exports to the Middle East, the wider “Balik-Islam” Movement (BIM), which 
continuously provides the necessary support base to radical groups of Islamic 
converts, will still be a major concern for the Philippine government. The influx of 
money from organizations in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, will 
continue to finance Islamic schools, mosques, community projects and other 
religious activities that will serve as a medium for recruitment and training of 
potential radical Islamic converts, and later potential terrorists. The lack of 
government supervision over returning overseas workers from the Middle East, 
as well as the absence of a re-integration program for these workers, will further 
increase the pool of recruits that BIM organizations may radicalize through 
indoctrinations and propaganda.   
Solving the problem of radicalism within the ranks of the “Balik-Islam” will 
be a lengthy process. Addressing the problem requires that the government look 
for solutions to the root causes of the Mindanao rebellion and the social 
discontent among Filipino Muslims. The socio-political-economic environment 
that sparked and flamed social discontent among Filipino Muslims, the 
organizational strength that propelled the movement to its growth and the various 
issues that bonded them together into a cohesive force should be addressed, not 
only by the government, but also by the entire society, since BIM is a product of 
interplay among a variety of social factors. 
Although the government signed the Philippine Human Security Act of 
2007 (the Philippine anti-terrorism law) in March 2007, the current Philippine anti 
and counter-terrorism efforts do not establish a specific program for addressing 
the rise of radical groups within the BIM. Considering that the Philippines is a 
democratic country that guarantees each citizen the freedom to choose and 
practice his own belief, the government cannot at present address an individual’s 
conversion to Islam. Even the current Philippine National Internal Security Plan 
(NISP), the main strategy to address various threat groups, does not have 
specific provisions for confronting the threat of radical Islamic converts in the 
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Philippines. NISP focuses on the communist insurgency and the threat of the 
ASG. However, the problem of radicalism within the ranks of BIM organizations 
undoubtedly poses a threat to the country’s security, and the government should 
make an effort to formalize plans for dealing with the problem.   
The Philippine government cannot solve the problem of terrorism and 
insurgency merely by capturing an organization’s leader and disrupting its 
networks. Historically, Islamist terrorist groups have re-emerged in other 
countries when new leaders rose up to carry on the struggle. Military solutions 
and active counter-terrorism efforts will not solve the problems either. In contrast, 
government policy must address the motivations, mindset, and desires of 
individuals because the strengths of the BIM are deeply rooted in the economic, 
social and political conditions of the Philippines. As long as there are valid 
grievances such as poverty, human rights abuses, corruption in the political 
system, perceived neglect of minorities and religious conflict within the social and 
political system, radical Islamic converts will continue to present a major 
challenge for the Philippine government. As Victor Corpus (1989), a Filipino 
general who was once an NPA leader, notes in his book The silent war, 
“eradicating insurgency is like eliminating grass in one’s cropland. Cutting the 
grass or burning it may clear the field for a while, but with the first drop of rain, 
the weeds will be back, vigorously choking the crop” (p. 181). Put simply, as long 
as there are peasants without land to till, workers without factories to work, 
frustrated professionals, students and other intellectuals who can provide 
leadership and other related skills and organizations that can provide the 
necessary resources, there will always be social movements that challenge the 
legitimacy of the Philippine state. The government must attend to these realities if 
it ever hopes to counteract terrorism effectively.  
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Philippine government can address the threat of developing radical 
groups within the growing “Balik-Islam” Movement (BIM) by providing a 
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comprehensive multi-agency solution that will address the social, political and 
economic causes lying behind the rise of such movements. Specifically, we 
recommended the following: 
1. Pursue an Attainable and Acceptable Peace Agreement 
between the MILF and the GRP in the Near Future 
This means that the Government of the Philippines (GRP) should continue 
peace negotiations with the MILF and other threat groups, relentlessly pursuing 
viable and acceptable provisions that will provide a lasting solution to the long 
existing Moro conflict in the Southern Philippines. The Philippine government 
should continue its current mechanism for dealing with the MILF. The 
government should enhance the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), which 
serves as a coordinating body for both the GRP and the MILF in resolving major 
conflicts in the peace process. The GRP should initiate more exploratory talks 
with the MILF on issues of “ancestral domain” and “self determination,” the major 
concerns in the current peace negotiations. Aside from the MILF, the GRP 
should also review the implementation of the existing peace agreement between 
the GRP and the MNLF that both signed in 1996 to avoid further grievances from 
the Filipino Muslims not only in Mindanao but also in the whole of the Philippines. 
One of the largest obstacles to overcome arises from within the MILF itself. MILF 
leaders do not seem to have a firm control over subordinate base commanders 
who may have deeper radical Islamic sympathies. These commanders allow 
foreign and domestic terrorists to use their bases for training and as safe havens 
(ICG Report, 2008, p. 5).  With conditions such as these present, the GRP 
should also highlight for the MILF and MNLF agreement provisions stipulating 
that they will not provide support or any form of assistance to terrorist 
organizations such as the ASG and JI. Likewise, MILF leaders must find a way to 
exercise the control over these commanders that they insist to the government 




complicated task, such a solution will offer the greatest benefits as it will 
decrease the grievances that feed the insurgent consciousness of Filipino Islamic 
converts. 
2. Institute Greater Inter-Agency Collaboration and Data 
Exchange between Different Government Agencies 
The Department of Foreign Affairs, Bureau of Immigration, Department of 
Labor and Employment and other government and law enforcement agencies 
involved should have effective information sharing on the monitoring, processing 
and supervision of overseas workers before leaving and after their return to the 
country. There should be a database for all returning Overseas Filipino Workers 
from the Middle East and other countries detailing necessary information on their 
backgrounds and affiliations to other organizations; further, all law enforcement 
agencies should possess ready access to this information. This database will 
allow the government to identify and monitor workers who have converted to 
Islam, received radical exposure or been involved in radical activities while 
working in the Middle East. Additionally, by providing relevant data for policy 
makers, the GRP will be able to develop effective programs and policies that 
enrich the OFW experience and reduce the grievances that they experience 
upon their return from abroad. 
3. Develop a Reintegration Program for Overseas Filipino 
Workers (OFW) 
The Philippines should offer returning Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) a 
re-integration program to the mainstream society that enables them to reintegrate 
with Philippine society and culture. The program should provide employment 
opportunities or livelihood programs that will allow them to develop a stable 
economic life after working abroad. As mentioned above, identifying and knowing 
the status of returning workers is paramount to implementing effective programs. 
By affording purpose and hope to workers who have chosen to return the  
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Philippines, the Philippines will reduce the frustrations of these individuals, thus 
robbing radical groups of opportunities to exploit the “insurgent consciousness” 
and form relationships for recruitment.  
4. Establish a Strong Security and Defense Organization 
The Philippines must ensure that the various security agencies involved in 
anti and counter-terrorism efforts—the military, the police and other government 
entities—are capable in performing their mandated tasks. They should have the 
manpower, logistics, and other resources necessary to addressing the threat of 
terrorism both in pro-active and reactive measures. The government must 
strengthen the present Anti Terrorism Council to provide strategic direction and 
coordinated efforts in confronting the root causes of terrorism in the country. 
Currently, the Anti Terrorism Task Force (ATTF) is in place as the multi-agency 
body to coordinate efforts between 46 agencies, yet the agency has “no power to 
synchronize efforts and is relegated to handling routine and administrative 
matters” (mid-level AFP Intelligence Officer, personal communication, April 4, 
2008). The government must expand this office and establish an effective 
mechanism for improving intelligence sharing and the exchange of databases 
among the military, police and other agencies involved in all anti and counter-
terrorism activities. This will enhance cooperation and avoid duplication of 
functions among the numerous agencies involved in defeating terrorism in the 
Philippines. 
5. Provide Strong Enforcement and Implementation of the 
“Human Security Act of 2007” (Philippine Anti-Terrorism Law) 
The newly approved Philippine anti-terrorism Law will provide additional 
means and other effective measures for various government agencies to address 
the terrorist threat in the country. The law will provide more authority to the 
military, police and other law enforcement units to monitor, detect and disrupt any 
groups or organizations engaged in activities related to terrorism. Agencies will 
be able to check, monitor and effectively disrupt the flow of funds from 
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international and local organizations to various terrorist groups in the Philippines. 
In addition, the law will provide for efficient and speedy judicial process for 
terrorism-related cases, particularly those still pending in courts involving top 
leaders of several terrorist groups in the Philippines. The new law will further 
offer guidelines to ensure that counter-terrorist operations respect the rule of law 
and human rights, and will not be used for political purposes to prosecute legal 
Muslim organizations and other individuals. Agencies must avoid abusing the law 
so that the legislation does not become a focal point of grievances from 
populations sympathetic to, if not supportive of, radical organizations. 
6. Cultivate Regional Cooperation and Exchange of Databases on 
Terrorism with Other Countries 
 Greater international cooperation will allow efficient monitoring, tracking 
and disruption of terrorist personalities and organizations that have links to 
neighboring countries like Malaysia and Indonesia as well as other Middle East 
organizations. The Philippines has a dialogue with ASEAN countries and works 
closely with the United States and Australia, but in order to prevent the migration 
of problems across neighboring countries, the Philippines must enhance 
cooperation with its regional partners. Speedy and open communication among 
regional partners will allow different governmental agencies to uncover links and 
networks of terrorist groups with organizations that are potential sources of 
funding for terrorist operations. 
7. Implement Good Governance in all Levels of the Political 
System 
Graft and corruption are two of the major causes of discontent among the 
populace, particularly those on the lower levels of Philippine society. The lack of 
transparency in the political system of governance, coupled with the abuses of 
power by political leaders, political dynasties and other corrupt practices cause a 
sense of frustration that then gives rise to social movements. The Philippines 
should enhance or fully implement the existing mechanisms for prosecuting 
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corrupt government officials and political leaders ensure good governance. While 
the Philippines is currently working to rectify these problems at the national level, 
they must make efforts to implement these standards at the local level of 
government, where the population is most affected. Further, good governance 
implies fair representation of all groups governed.   
8. Introduce Education Programs and Regulate Islamic Schools 
Effective government education programs can counter the propaganda 
and recruitment efforts of radical groups. Using media and other educational 
means, the government can limit the ability of radical groups to propagate the 
use of violence. Concerned government agencies can conduct Information drives 
and other forms of media outreach programs to counter the recruitment activities 
of radical groups in schools, work places, public forum and jails. Agencies can 
offer overseas workers going to Middle Eastern countries with awareness training 
and briefings on the issue of radical Islam. In addition, concerned government 
agencies can monitor Islamic schools to ensure that they are not propagating 
radical teachings in their programs. However, due to constitutional mandates, the 
government cannot and will not infringe upon freedom of religion in the 
Philippines (Secretary of National Defense (SND), personal communication, April 
5, 2008).  Recognizing this constraint, the challenge for the government is to find 
a way to prevent radical groups from using this freedom as a guise to propagate 
hatred (President, National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP), personal 
communication, April 2, 2008).  
9.  Institute a Single National ID System 
Creating a national single identification system similar to that of countries 
like Malaysia and Singapore will allow government agencies to have a single 
database of vital information about its citizens. Talks of implementing a national 
ID card have already risen in the Philippines (GMA News Research, 2008, p. 1). 
Strong opponents suggest that such a measure would be an infringement upon 
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civil liberties and government officials would inevitably abuse the system. On the 
contrary, a national ID card would require no more information than exists on 
driver’s licenses, bank accounts, and passports. By ensuring that every Filipino 
receives a national ID card, government agencies would greatly enhance their 
ability to identify and track suspected terrorists and their related organizations. 
Further, the system would provide data that would increase the government’s 
ability to create and implement policies.   
The solutions described above directly counteract the key factors McAdam 
describes as essential for a social movement to be successful. The following 
table below summarizes the interaction between the recommended solution and 
the factors discussed in this thesis. 
 





1. Resolution to Moro-
Conflict   X 
2. Inter-Agency 
Collaboration X X  
3. Re-integration 
Program for OFW   X 
4. Strong Defense 
Organization X  X 
5.  Anti-Terrorism Laws  X  
6.  Regional Cooperation X   
7. Good Governance X  X 
8. Regulation of Schools   X 
9. ID System  X  
 
Table 1.   Recommended solutions and their focus area of effect. 
Clearly, several solutions have effects that hamper a radical movement’s 
abilities regarding more than one factor. None of these solutions isolated from 
the others will remove the threat of RSIM-like organizations. Obviously, feasibility 




analyzed to ensure that the solutions adopted achieve their goals without 
creating more opportunities or grievances on which RSIM-like groups are able to 









Figure 2.   Map of the Philippines and Southeast Asia (From: www.icg.org) 
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APPENDIX B.  MAP OF THE PHILIPPINES 
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APPENDIX C.  MAP OF MINDANAO 
 
 
Figure 4.   Map of Southern Philippines (From: Klempp, 2006) 
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